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Executive summary 
This thesis examines whether the Eurozone forms an optimal currency area by analyzing each 
of the 17 member countries’ contribution to increased wealth for the Eurozone. Furthermore, 
how the member countries have been affected by losing their national monetary policy when 
entering the Eurozone, in form of increased volatility in inflation and output, unemployment 
and fiscal situation.  
The results of the analysis suggest that without Greece, the remaining member countries 
would have formed a better currency area, and that Ireland is the only country that tends to 
have net costs from the introduction of the euro and the loss of its national monetary policy. 
The analysis is followed by a brief discussion of different scenarios for the Eurozone; a break-
up, no-change and an adapt-to-succeed view, which includes suggestions of measures of 
structural improvements for the Eurozone, e.g. centralized budgets with Eurobonds or 
restructuring the Eurozone into a complete political union.  
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Preface 
This thesis is conducted as a finishing part of my Master of Science in Economics and 
Business Administration, with major in Financial Economics at the Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH).  
The main purpose of this thesis will be to answer the following problem; does the Eurozone 
form an optimal currency area. I intend have a broad perspective at the different aspects of 
this matter, and to gather information to get a full view of the situation and what is up for 
discussion as possible measures. The Eurozone was created on basis of political reasons, and 
economic matters were de-emphasized, I want to look at economic consequences of the 
creation of the Eurozone and the introduction of the euro.  
The motivation behind my choice of topic is that I wanted to write my master thesis about a 
subject with high degree of actuality, and use macroeconomic theories to answer some of the 
problems that are up for discussion. The problems that have aroused from the loss of national 
monetary policy have been severe, and the Eurozone is now at a cross-road which got me 
thinking; what happens if the Eurozone breaks up, or what are the costs if there are not any 
major changes in the system. It must be a middle way, some obvious measures to stabilize the 
national economies in crisis.  
I wish to thank my advisor, Karl Rolf Pedersen, for his feedback.  
Bergen, 18 June 2012  
 
 
      
Siri Olset Øvrebø 
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1. Introduction 
The recent years have been turbulent for the Eurozone as a monetary union, and its whole 
structure is in danger of a break-down. The global financial crisis in 2008 led to eruptions of 
more crises in the Eurozone; a fiscal crisis in Greece, a banking crisis that originated from 
Ireland and spread to the Eurozone, a competitive crisis and a major sovereign debt crisis 
(Bergsteen and Kirkegaard, 2012).  
In the first years after introducing the common currency, the euro, positive effects can be 
located in employment, inflation, financial stability etc. Candidate countries noticed all these 
positive effects, and assumed that their economy would become more stable if they also 
joined. It became so important for some countries to join the European Monetary Union that 
even though they did not meet the criteria, they forged their budgets to get accepted (part 2.1). 
That was when the problems started to get serious.  
1.1 Presentation of the problem 
The years after the introduction of the euro can be characterized by that fact that the euro was 
a success, the effects from a common currency was positive until financial markets became 
unstable and consequences of the loss of national monetary policy were proved to be severe. 
There have been many discussions lately about the Eurozone, if some countries are better off 
seceding from the union, in addition to discussions about many the measures that can be 
conducted to improve the structure and dynamics of the union. I chose my master thesis topic 
after reading some of these articles, and I have formulated the following problem:   
Does the Eurozone, as it is today, form an optimal currency area? 
I do not intend to answer this problem explicitly, but to sum up the most important pointers in 
the thesis which leaves an open interpretation to the reader.  
To be able to answer this problem, it is important to know what characterizes an optimal 
currency area. Paul de Grauwe states that the Eurozone form an optimal currency area when 
all member countries increase wealth, and the benefits from being in a currency union exceeds 
the costs (2009). A country should only join the currency union if both the country and the 
union as a whole will gain from its membership.  
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There are a lot of definitions of wealth, and they usually consist of the same factors such as; 
financial wealth associated with profits, welfare in which legal institutions lead to the feeling 
of being secure, health organs, happiness and prosperity; standard of living (Dictionary.com, 
2012). 
If the Eurozone forms an optimal currency area, where all countries benefit from their 
memberships, a break-up of the Eurozone would be out of the question, and measures should 
be made to improve the structure of the heavily debated monetary union. On the other hand, if 
the Eurozone does not form an optimal currency area, it is important to locate the 
country/countries in question, and whether or not it/they affect the currency area in a way that 
its costs exceed the benefits to be able to find the best possible solution.  
1.2 The angle of the thesis 
I intend to address the problems in the Eurozone by width and not depth because I believe that 
getting an impression of the bigger picture leads to finding the best possible solutions.  
1.3 The motivation behind the creation of the Eurozone 
The European Union was created with the vision of free flow of capital goods, services, labor 
and capital. The founders of EU tried to create a single market in Europe, but due to the 
monetary turmoil in Europe, the exchange rates went in different directions, which is 
contradictable to a single market. The only way to create a single market in Europe was to 
create a common currency, and furthermore the ECU was created which turned out to be a 
success (ECB, 2009). The main idea behind the euro was to take the ECU to a further level, 
and create a currency which would be used by all the EU members.  
1.4 Members of the European Union 
There are 27 member countries in the EU (European Union, n.d.). Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands formed the EU in 1952. Denmark, Ireland and United 
Kingdom became members in 1973. Greece became an EU member in 1981, and Portugal and 
Spain in 1986. In 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. Furthermore, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
became members in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Candidate countries in 2012 
are Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.  
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1.5 Members of the European Monetary Union 
There are 17 countries that are members of the European Monetary Union, also called the 
Eurozone. There were originally 11 member countries when the Maastricht Treaty was signed 
in 1991 (EC Commission, 2012); Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. Other countries has later fulfilled 
the criteria and joined the union; Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta 
(2008), Slovakia (2009) and Estonia (2011).  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Part 2 will present important characteristics, facts and developments in the European 
Monetary Union that will be important for the rest of the thesis. Part 3 will present the theory 
of optimal currency areas. Part 4 will analyze the problem and starts by an evaluation of the 
management of the monetary and fiscal policy by the ECB for the Eurozone as a whole. 
Furthermore, the individual countries are analyzed in relation to net benefits from the theory 
of optimal currency areas, and also the effects for each member country from being in a 
monetary union and losing its national monetary policy is analyzed. Part 5 presents the results 
which sum up the analysis. There will be a discussion of possible measures in part 6, and part 
7 concludes.  
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2. Characteristics and developments in the Eurozone 
In this section, I am going to write about characteristics and developments that are relevant 
for the rest of my thesis; criteria to join EMU, the Euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and monetary and fiscal policy in the Eurozone. This section will partly be based on Paul de 
Grauwe’s; economics of monetary union (2009).  
 
2.1 Criteria to join EMU 
The criteria to join the monetary union in Europe are stated in the Maastricht Treaty, which 
was signed by the leaders of the EU, in the Dutch city Maastricht, in December 1991. The 
purpose of the treaty was to prepare for a monetary union by deciding on criteria that had to 
be fulfilled before a country could obtain membership, and to implement elements that would 
eventually facilitate for a political union (citizenship and common foreign and internal affairs 
policy) (European Union, n.d.). There are two principals that were stated in the treaty (Euro 
Treaties, 1992); (1) a gradual transition into a monetary union and (2) the candidate countries 
have to satisfy the following convergence criteria;   
 Inflation; no higher than 1,5% more than the average of the three lowest inflation rates 
among the EU countries 
 Long term interest rate; no higher than 2% more than the average in three low-
inflation countries 
 Exchange rate; no devaluation of national currency two years prior to membership, 
membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
 Government budget deficit; must not exceed 3% of GDP  
 Government debt; must not exceed 60% of GDP 
In May 1998, the 11 countries stated above more or less satisfied these criteria; Greece did not 
at that time, but did so in 2001 and introduced the euro in January 1, 2002. Denmark, Sweden 
and United Kingdom decided to stay out of the monetary union even though they fulfilled the 
criteria (De Grauwe, 2009). UK has the right to opt out, and Denmark decided to let the entry 
decision be the case of a national referendum. Sweden deliberately refused to enter the 
exchange rate mechanism, and thereby failed to satisfy one of the entry conditions.  
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The convergence requirements are subject to ensure common goals, e.g. low inflation, and for 
countries to prove their worthiness, of a membership in the union, everyone waited 10 years. 
High debt and budget deficits can cause risk of high inflation, which will increase costs for 
the union as a whole. To prevent countries from manipulating their exchange rate, they could 
not change it within two years prior to a potential membership in the union.  
Some of the Eurozone candidates did not satisfy one or more of the criteria, e.g. the debt 
levels were over 100% in Italy and Greece. Even Germany did not satisfy the budget rules; 
the debt level was over 60% and increasing. The Treaty was ignored due to strong political 
will to proceed with the implementation of a common currency.  
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2.2 Euro and the financial markets 
The monetary union started functioning from January 1, 1999, when the European Central 
bank took over control of monetary decisions from the national central banks, and the term 
euro came to its existence. The national currencies were still in use in its respective country, 
and the exchange rates to the euro were irrevocably fixed. The euro in form of banknotes and 
coins was introduced January 1, 2002, and the national currencies were taken out of 
circulation.   
A common currency is most advantageous when there is full integration in different markets 
between countries. For the euro to function as an insurance mechanism in the presence of 
asymmetric shocks, it is important that the financial markets between countries are integrated. 
When the financial markets are fully integrated, the effects of asymmetric shocks will be less 
severe due to the fact that investors from one country invest in financial assets in other 
countries, and there will be a risk-sharing mechanism due to diversified investors and 
markets. On the road to fully integrated financial markets, an important obstacle has been 
eliminated; the exchange risk, but more are still in the way, e.g. differences in legal systems 
and country associated risk.  
Some markets are virtually fully integrated; the interbank markets and the government bond 
markets. Other markets integrate slowly; the corporate bond market, equity markets and the 
banking sector. The main obstacles for integration in these markets are differences in legal 
and regulatory systems like accounting and taxation rules, corporate governance practices and 
the fact that banks are regulated differently between national territories.  
One goal when creating the euro was for it to become an international currency, and now the 
euro reserve holdings by central banks make up more than 25%. For the euro to become 
international, the equity and bond markets need to grow. The financial size matters because it 
influences the liquidity of financial assets, and it gives a competitive advantage when the 
diversity and choice of investment opportunities are increased. Another factor for the euro to 
become an international currency is monetary and financial stability at home.  
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2.3 The European Central Bank  
With a common currency in place, the Eurozone also needed a common central bank, and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) was introduced with the euro in 1999. The role as a decision 
maker of monetary and exchange rate policy shifted from the national central banks to the 
European Central Bank (Scheller, 2004). The national central banks most important 
responsibilities are to implement decisions taken by ECB, reassure financial stability in its 
country, and banking supervision.   
ECB follows a central banking model called “the German model” (De Grauwe, 2009), another 
such model is the Anglo-French model. The main features of the German model are that price 
stability is the primary objective and the central bank is politically independent. Objectives 
like output and employment can only be pursued when not interfering with price stability.  
2.3.1 The institutional framework of ECB 
The national central banks and the ECB are part of the Eurosystem. ECB is often used as a 
synonym for the Eurosystem, and it is important to know the difference.  
 
Figure 1: The Eurosystem (Gerdesmeier et al., 2009) 
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Figure 1 illustrates how the Eurosystem consists of ECB and all the national central banks in 
the member countries. The representatives, one from each national central bank and the 
executive board of 6, make the Governing Council. The Governing Council formulates 
monetary policy and makes decisions about interest rates, reserve requirement and provision 
of liquidity based on the concerns of the Eurozone as a whole. The European Central Bank 
delegates the implementation of the monetary policy to each national bank. Further in this 
thesis, ECB will be used as a synonym for the Eurosystem. 
2.3.2 ECB as independent, accountable and transparent 
The ECB is designed to be independent and protected by political interference, which is 
important to maintain price stability. The Eurosystem (ECB and NCB’s) are not allowed to be 
influenced by any government of an EU member state, and are prohibited to lend money to 
any public sector entity (ECB, n.d.). If the ECB was to be political dependent, politicians may 
have used the monetary policy to win elections by promising stable budgets by printing 
money, but when printing money, prices will increase and lead to price instability.  
An independent institution like the ECB should be accountable for the conduct of its policies 
to citizens and representatives. The ECB sees itself as accountable due to the fact that the 
representatives go beyond their obligations of reporting, they have monthly reports in the 
“Monthly Bulletin” instead of quarterly reports (ECB, n.d.). However, there is no one to exert 
control over the central banks performance due to the absence of a political union. The 
objectives in the Maastricht Treaty are vague when it comes to responsibilities next to price 
stability, and there is a lack of effective supervision of banks (De Grauwe, 2009).  
Transparency is achieved by effective communication and is considered crucial by most 
central banks. The definition of transparency stated by the ECB is; “the central bank provides 
the general public and the markets with all relevant information on its strategy, assessments 
and policy decisions as well as its procedures in an open, clear and timely manner” (ECB, 
n.d.). With a transparent monetary policy, the central bank can obtain credibility among the 
public to exert the policy more effectively by making consequences more predictable. When 
publishing information which is credible and consistent, market participants create 
expectations about the future, and expectations have a tendency to become self-fulfilling, 
which is intended by the central bank.  
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2.4 Monetary policy in the Eurozone 
From the Maastricht Treaty it has been interpreted that price stability is the main objective for 
policymaking. The definition of price stability in the Eurozone is stated in the ECB Monthly 
Bulletin, January 1999; “an annual increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) of below 2% can be considered as being compatible with this primary objective of 
monetary policy” (ECB, 1999, p.9). Later, in May 2003, this definition was redefined at to 
include the terms “below, but close to 2%” and “medium term” (ECB, 2003, p.5). The 
strategy to achieve this target is proposed in a “two-pillar” approach; (a) the monetary 
approach and (b) the identification of numbers of variables that provide important information 
to forecast future inflation. In 2003, this first-pillar was de-emphasized, and the role of money 
became less prominent in the monetary decisions, it has since then been used as a cross-check. 
This decision was made due to the fact that money growth had almost no power predicting 
inflation; M3 exceeded the target of 4,5% every year, but inflation remained stable.  
Price stability was emphasized to financial stability because it was seen as a way to minimize 
the risk of financial instability. In addition, the supervisors and regulators are seen as 
responsible for maintaining financial stability.  
(a) The monetary approach based on the quantity theory equation;  
Equation 2.1           
where m is the money stock, v is the velocity of money, p is the price level, and y is real GDP, 
all terms are in logarithms. If we transform this equation into first difference, the numbers can 
approximately be interpreted as growth rates (the change from one year to another);  
Equation 2.2                
The ECB made forecasts for the future trend growth of GDP and velocity of respectively 2% 
and –0.5% per annum (ECB, 1999, p.9). With an inflation target of close to 2%, the money 
stock (broad monetary aggregate, M3) should not increase by more than 4.5% per annum. 
This can be seen as a ‘reference value’ of the money stock growth. Note that this value can 
change if GDP and/or velocity changes.  
ECB use money stock as an intermediate target to reach the ultimate target of inflation, below, 
but close to 2%. In comparison, inflation forecast is used by some countries as intermediate 
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target to achieve the ultimate target of inflation. In both approaches, the interest rate is used as 
an instrument to control the intermediate target.  
(b) Forecasting future inflation 
A number of variables have an influence on future inflation, these are carefully watched by 
the ECB so that measures can be taken at an early stage to steer actual inflation towards the 
inflation target of 2%; wages, exchange rate, bond prices, yield curve, measures of real 
activity, fiscal policy indicators, price and cost indices and business and consumer surveys 
(ECB, 1999). When one of these indicators signals a threat to future price stability, ECB can 
use short-term interest rates and/or reduce liquidity in the system to prevent the inflation from 
deviating from the target.   
Criticism to this approach is that ECB narrows its responsibilities by having only one target; 
price stability. It is not always a trade-off between output and price level stabilization when 
shocks occur as illustrated in the figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Effects of demand and supply shocks (De Grauwe, 2009) 
 
When there is a demand shock in the economy, both output and price level will increase, and 
when taking measures to correct the increasing price level, output will also be corrected. 
There is no trade-off between price and output stabilization when shocks in aggregate demand 
occur. A demand shock is in most cases temporary. On the other hand, when there is a supply 
shock, the situation will be handled differently. There will be a trade-off between output level 
and price level, and due to the fact that ECB only have one target; inflation, monetary policy 
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will always be set to correct the price level, which will lead to an even lower level of output 
after correcting for the negative supply shock. A supply shock often tends to be permanent, 
and can be the case of technological developments.  
The ECB monetary policy can be characterized as strict inflation targeting and is illustrated in 
figure 3. The ECB has opened up for some output stabilization after the definition of 
monetary policy was revised to include the medium run term, it does not have to react to 
change in inflation immediately.  
 
Figure 3: Trade-off between inflation and output gap (Steigum, 2004) 
 
A strict inflation target involves low variability in inflation traded with high variability in 
output, in the case of a supply shock. Only considering price stability, monetary policy can 
contribute to fuel a boom created by technological developments, or fail to see ominous 
developments in asset markets created by ‘animal spirit’1 (Keynes, 1936), in this case they do 
nothing. Strict inflation targeting cannot be maintained because it can conflict with financial 
stability. 
                                      
1 human emotion that drives consumer confidence and trust, e.g. hope and fear 
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2.4.1 Monitoring financial instability instead of price stability?  
In macroeconomic models, developed with assumptions of perfect capital markets, informed 
and rational agents and no transfer costs, price stability implies financial stability. These 
models, along with the fact that financial stability is difficult to monitor, makes the decision to 
focus solely on price stability easy for policymakers.  
In fact, when monitoring financial instability instead of financial stability, the monetary 
authorities can obtain important information about developments that can threaten financial 
stability by two variables; asset prices and credit growth. “Financial instability is a situation in 
which: a) some important set of financial asset prices seem to have diverged sharply from 
fundamentals; and/or b) market functioning and credit availability, domestically and perhaps 
internationally, have been significantly distorted; with the result that c) aggregate spending 
deviates (or is likely to deviate) significantly from the economy’s ability to produce”  
(Ferguson, 2002).  
2.4.2 Monetary policy instruments in the Eurozone 
The Eurosystem has three sets of instruments in the operational framework to control 
monetary policy in the Eurozone; open market operations, standing facilities and minimum 
reserves (ECB, n.d).  
Open market operations increase or reduce money market liquidity by selling and buying 
securities by transactions using tenders. This illustrates the role of the interest rate as an 
instrument, which is set to be applied on the main refinancing operations, the repo rate. The 
rate currently used is a fixed-rate set by the Governing Council. The purposes of the open 
market operations are to signal the ECB’s policy stance, manage the liquidity situation in the 
Eurozone and control interest rates (ECB, n.d). The developments in variable and fixed repo 
rates from 1999 to 2011 are shown in figure 4.  
Standing facilities provide and absorb overnight liquidity to banks and are managed by the 
NCB’s through (1) the marginal lending facility, where the marginal lending rate is typically 
1% higher than the repo rate, and (2) the marginal deposit facility, where the marginal deposit 
rate is typically 1% lower than the repo rate. The lending and deposit rates are fixed by the 
Governing Council, and the developments in these rates are also shown in figure 4.    
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The developments in fixed/variable repo-rates, marginal lending rate and marginal deposit 
rate from January 1999 to December 2011;  
 
Figure 4: Key interest rates used by ECB (ECB, n.d.) 
 
Minimum reserves affect money market conditions by changing reserve requirements, which 
create shortage/increase liquidity and control the money stock. This instrument is not used in 
monetary policy, but to smooth short-term interest rates. It can be a useful instrument to 
control bank credit when it is expanding too quickly.  
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2.5 Fiscal policy in the Eurozone 
Fiscal policy can be used to achieve financial stability when the government uses the tools of 
tax change, change in government spending, and introduction to new legislations that can 
change the reaction of participants in the economy, but these are not flexible instruments. It 
takes time to achieve results when using fiscal policy, and when it is used once, it will take 
many years until it can be used again. When using fiscal policy, a decline in public spending 
tends to be more effective in terms of generating surplus, in oppose to a rise in the tax rates 
(Semmler et al., 2005).  
In the Eurozone, monetary policy is centralized to be managed by the Eurosystem and fiscal 
policy is decentralized to be managed by each member state. Fiscal policy does not have that 
direct effect that monetary policy has, and is less effective when it comes to stabilization, and 
in particular for countries with high levels of government debt and large budget deficits. The 
efficiency of the monetary policy can be affected by the fiscal policy’s long-term conditions 
for economic growth. When fiscal policy is in the hands of the government in each country, 
there is a possibility that this power may be used for political benefits, and not economic 
benefits, by politicians to win elections.  
The Maastricht Treaty gives explicit quantitative guidelines for management of national 
budgets; government debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP and budget deficit over 3% can get a 
country fined (up to 0,5% of GDP), and whether or not these strict rule generates more or less 
discipline is discussed in part 6 of this thesis.  
2.5.1 The Stability and Growth Pact 
The purpose of the stability and growth pact is to ensure stability in government debt and 
budgets. It consists of a surveillance part; a warning system, and a dissuasive part, when 
surveillance does not give results. The main features of the Stability and Growth Pact can be 
summarized the following way (De Grauwe, 2009);  
Surveillance: Members of the Eurozone have to submit Stability Programs which focuses on 
public finance and aims at bringing about a budgetary position close to balance or surplus; 
this program is examined and monitored by the Council.  
Dissuasive: A budget deficit is excessive if it exceeds the reference value of 3% of GDP. 
When a country has a budget deficit over 3%, they can get fined by 0,5% of GDP. There are 
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two exceptions to this rule; “(i) it results from an unusual event outside the control of the 
member state (natural disaster), (ii) it results from a severe economic downturn (decline in 
GDP over 2% annual)” (Cabral, 2001). The Council decides whether it is an excessive deficit 
or not. The member country has 6 months to correct this before it gets fined. If the Council 
decides to impose a sanction, the country involved will have to make a non-interest bearing 
deposit, and if the excessive deficit is not corrected within two years, the deposit turns into a 
fine.  
The reason for these direct and strict guidelines is that when a country has increasing debt and 
deficit, the Eurozone as a whole has to pay higher interest rates. It is fair that the country gets 
punished and has to pay a fine.  
SGP has gained a lot of criticism due to the lack of flexibility of national budgetary policies, 
and was later reformed into being more flexible and give more emphasis to debt levels in 
evaluating the member countries’ fiscal position.  
2.5.2 Debt dynamics 
An increase in real government debt is a common characteristic after a severe financial crisis 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). The increase in debt is caused by a collapse in tax revenues, in 
addition to an increase in government spending to ease the downturn in a deep and long 
recession. This increase in debt can be observed among many of the Eurozone countries after 
the financial crisis, and it has been discussed whether the debt levels are sustainable or not. 
The debt dynamic theory presented in this paragraph is based on Helmut Gärtner (2006) and 
lecture notes from NHH by Rolf Jens Brunstad (2012).  
b: government debt ratio in percent of GDP 
g: government spending in percent of GDP 
t: tax income in percent of GDP 
µm: money financed deficit in percent of GDP 
y: growth in real GDP 
r: government real interest rate on debt 
The nominal increase in government debt can be written as (see appendix A for full 
derivation);  
Equation 2.4            (   )  
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When looking at the equation graphically, the first part of the equation (g – t – µm) is the 
constant and the latter (y – r) is the slope, and debt dynamics can look like this if the budget 
deficit is positive and growth in real GDP is higher than the long term interest rate on debt;  
 
Figure 5: Effects on changes in debt level (Gärtner, 2006) 
 
In equilibrium, the growth rate of debt is constant (∆b = 0), and can be calculated by the 
following equation;  
Equation 2.5      
       
   
 
Furthermore, µm is assumed to be 0, and the equilibrium can be characterized by; 
1. High growth and budget deficit (r < y and g > t)  
In the long run, the debt ratio will be b* for any given debt ratio today, as long as the deficit is 
given (figure 6). The debt ratio will converge to zero with a balanced budget and a GDP 
growth larger than the real interest rate on debt.  
2. High growth and budget surplus (r < y and g < t) 
In this case there is a budget surplus, which makes the government a creditor in equilibrium, 
b*. The equilibrium is stable due to GDP growth being larger than real interest rate on debt.  
 
24 
 
3. Low growth and budget deficit (r > y and g > t) 
When real interest rate on debt exceeds real growth in GDP, there are two consequences; the 
government is a creditor in equilibrium, b*, and the debt ratio equilibrium is fragile. In oppose 
to the cases mentioned above, there are endogenous processes that will move the debt ratio 
away from equilibrium with any small displacements. Stabilization is difficult, but possible.   
4. Low growth and budget surplus (r > y and g < t) 
This equilibrium is also characterized by instability. The government is running a budget 
surplus, but the equilibrium requires debt.   
There four cases are illustrated in this figure;  
 
Figure 6: Debt dynamics (Gärtner, 2006) 
 
Macroeconomic theory states that when a country is in recession, the government should 
increase spending and/or reduce tax to trigger actions among market participants that will 
boost the economy and lead to growth in GDP. This is not always true, because the only 
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situation an increase in government spending is throughout positive is when the increase in 
government spending is due to government investment, which produces benefits in the future 
(Gartner, 2006). The future returns should exceed the interest rate on debt.  
If the budget deficit is increasing, the budget deficit is larger than the difference between GDP 
growth and real interest on debt rate plus money financed deficit in percent of GDP ((g-t) > 
(y-r)b+µm), the real debt ratio in percent of GDP will increase. The country’s 
creditworthiness will fall which will lead to an increase in interest rate on debt. The country 
will lose its ability to manage debt and with no financial help, they can go bankrupt.  
Countries with increasing debt and budget deficit can reduce their debt ratios by increase tax 
rates or reduce government spending. The consequence of e.g. a tax reduction is that a 
restricted fiscal policy will reduce household’s disposable income, and the demand will 
decrease. Decreased demand will lower sales of durable goods and services, and postpone 
investments. When the demand decreases, companies tend to reduce prices to increase sale, 
and a decrease in prices will affect price levels negatively. Lower inflation and unchanged 
nominal interest rates will increase the real interest rate, and together with the reduced growth 
in GDP, the country will have more debt problems.  
Another measure to reduce debt ratios can be to increase inflation. This can be done by 
financing debt or by ‘debt erosion’; an unforeseen increase in inflation will reduce the debt’s 
real value. The latter only works for domestic creditors or debt in domestic currency. Debt can 
be financed by printing money or by private loans. There has been discussed whether the 
positive effects (government revenue) of printing money exceeds the negative effects 
(inflation tax), printing money does not seem to be a profitable option. If debt is financed by 
private loans, it will eat up private savings, which will reduce capital stock and lead to a 
steady state, and potential income (when investing).  
2.5.3 Fiscal devaluation as an instrument for national authorities 
Conditions for an optimal currency union are high labor mobility and wage and price 
flexibility, to make up for the loss of the exchange rate instrument as a stabilization 
mechanism. When the exchange rate cannot be devalued when a country loses 
competitiveness, as for all the members of the Eurozone, other measures must be considered. 
After the financial crisis, the term ‘fiscal devaluation’ has been mentioned as such an 
instrument; a shift in tax from employers to consumers (De Mooij and Keen, 2012). A fiscal 
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devaluation can have positive effects e.g. reduced wage costs from lower tax rates on labor, 
increased incentives to work, and export becomes cheaper which increases competitiveness. 
Fiscal devaluation will only have these effects if employees do not bargain for higher nominal 
wages, and firms use lower tax rates to cut export prices (Pettinger, 2011).  
This fiscal devaluation will work in the short run when nominal wages are fixed. A cut in 
social contribution will result in lower labor costs and a reduction in export prices. Increased 
VAT applies to import and demand tiles towards domestic products.  
There are some practical issues with fiscal devaluation, there is a question concerning the size 
of the shift, endogeneity in terms the increased export demand also would lead to increased 
employment and revenue from social contributors, what about the losers of the VAT being 
increased who does not gain from the contribution cut, like pensioners.   
The effect becomes insignificant, but after 10 years (De Mooij and Keen, 2012).  
2.5.4 Financial stability mechanisms 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, debt problems in many Eurozone countries aroused. 
Countries were in desperate need for liquidity, but more debt was neither an option nor a 
possibility. The high debt levels led to downgrades in creditworthiness, which led to higher 
risk premium, made the debt unsustainable and threatened countries with bankruptcy.  
Two temporary money funds were established;  
- EFSM: European Financial Stabilization Mechanism; administrated by the 
Commission and guaranteed by EU (60 billion euro) (EC Commission, 2012) 
- EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility; entity in Luxembourg, guaranteed by the 
members of the Eurozone (440 billion euro) (ESFS, 2012) 
A more permanent scheme is to be introduced in July 2012 and will function next to EFSM 
and EFSF for a given period in time until it replaces them; the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) (500 billion euro) (The Economist, 2012). ESM is an intergovernmental organization 
which goes hand in hand with a fiscal compact designed to ensure budgetary discipline among 
Eurozone members (ECB, 2011). ECB has the role to provide loans and purchase bonds in the 
primary market. It is called Europe’s version of the International Monetary Fund, and is an 
international finance institution, guaranteed by the members of the Eurozone, where the 
capital responsibility is weighted by GDP. 
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3. The theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) 
In this section I am going to present an outline of a cost benefit analysis based on the theory 
from Paul De Grauwe’s; economics of monetary union (2009). After I have stated theoretical 
costs, benefits and net benefits of a currency area, the net benefits will be applied to the 
Eurozone’s member countries in part 4.2.   
 
3.1 Costs 
The main cost for a country when joining a common currency area, is the loss of the ability to 
conduct national monetary policy. A country cannot use interest rate to control for price 
pressures and instabilities in the economy, and cannot use the exchange rate to increase 
competitiveness or reduce the cost of foreign debt. These are a country’s most important and 
most effective instruments to maintain financial and price stability. Most costs of a monetary 
union are related to the loss of interest rate and exchange rate as tools, and it will be explained 
how asymmetric shocks and structural differences between member countries can be costly 
without the right tools.  
3.1.1. Asymmetric shocks 
When asymmetric shocks occur in a monetary union, it is important that each member country 
have the right mechanisms to correct for such shocks. It has also been a discussion on whether 
or not a membership in a monetary union will increase or decrease the frequency of 
asymmetric shocks, these aspects will be presented below.  
3.1.1.1 Mechanisms to control for asymmetric shocks 
When interest rate and exchange rate cannot be used to correct for asymmetric shocks because 
a country is in a monetary union, it is important to have flexible mechanisms in labor markets 
and/or the ability for budget transfers. If not, asymmetric shocks can be very costly.  
The theory on how to respond to asymmetric shocks is based on Mundell (Mundell, 1961). It 
is important to know if the asymmetric shock is temporary or permanent, shocks in demand 
are often temporary, and shocks in supply are often permanent (Balke, 1991). Shocks in 
demand can be changes in consumption or investment driven by expectations, policy 
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measures to regulate demand, and shocks in income and wealth, demand shocks can be 
permanent in terms of changes in preferences among consumers. Shocks in supply typically 
comes from an increase in productivity due to the introduction of new technology, policy 
changes in the labor market and other aspects of the economy, and “cheap import” from 
China. If the shock is temporary, the consequences are not severe and the country will not 
suffer much from the loss of its instruments to the currency union. If the shock is permanent, 
the consequences may be severe without the right correction mechanisms.  
There are three mechanisms that can correct for a permanent asymmetric shock; 
i) Wage flexibility 
ii) Labor force mobility 
iii) Public or private insurance mechanisms 
To illustrate how these mechanisms work to correct for the shock, I will use an example with 
an asymmetric shock in demand where consumer preferences changes from a good in country 
A to a good in country B in a monetary union. The consequences for country A will be a loss 
in output due to the decrease in demand, and increased unemployment due to loss in income. 
Country A will experience a bust; a downward pressure in prices. Country B will have the 
opposite effects; an increase in output due to an increase in demand, and when the output and 
income increases, they will hire more and reduce unemployment. Country B will experience a 
boom; an upward pressure in prices. The costs of a monetary union can be severe if there are 
no correction mechanisms in the markets to correct for the effects of the shock in this example 
if the shock is permanent.  
Flexibility in wages is one important mechanism that is of great advantage in a monetary 
union. If wages are flexible, country A can correct for the increase in unemployment due to 
the fact that workers will reduce their wage claims, the price on products can be lowered and 
products become more competitive; the demand will increase. A demand increase in country 
B will put an upward pressure on wages, and with an increase in wages, prices tend to 
increase. The products become less competitive and the demand will be reduced. 
If the labor force is mobile, the shock will be corrected in the following manner; the 
unemployed from country A will move to country B to work, the wage claims will not be 
reduced as above, and the unemployment problem is corrected in country A. The increase of 
labor force in country B will not put a pressure on wages, and the pressure on prices is gone.  
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These mechanisms are most favorable because the labor market will automatically adjust to 
eliminate negative effects of such a shock. If these mechanisms are not in place for a country 
in a currency union there is a third, but less favorable, alternative; insurance mechanisms.  
An insurance mechanism can be characterized as an income transfer between involved 
countries. The problem with this alternative is when asymmetric shocks are permanent, and 
the income transfer prevents the adjustment mechanisms from operating; the receiving 
country will obtain a permanent disequilibrium in terms of the transfers becoming permanent, 
and the insurance scheme unsustainable. If the transfers lead to country A not adjusting 
wages, the insurance mechanism will lead to moral hazard. A public insurance system is when 
there is a redistribution of the government budget; country A pays less tax due to an increase 
in unemployment, and country B pays more tax due to increases in wages. Government 
spending is increased in country A and lowered in country B. For this to be possible, the 
monetary union is in need of a centralized budget. A private insurance scheme functions 
through financial markets. As explained in part 2.2, if the monetary union have fully 
integrated financial markets, and there will be a risk-sharing mechanism when stocks are held 
both by citizens of country A and B. Moral hazard will in this case be lower/not existent 
compared to a public insurance system. The main problem with a private insurance system is 
the fact that most households do not operate in the stock market, and the ‘smoothing effect’ 
will be limited.   
If none of these three mechanisms are present in member countries of a monetary union, the 
loss of interest rate and exchange rate as correction tools can be very costly.  
3.1.1.2 The frequency of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union 
Based on theory presented by Mundell, the discussion whether asymmetric shocks occur more 
or less frequently has aroused. There are two main views on this aspect; the view of the 
European Commission, and the Krugman view.  
The European Commission view states that in a monetary union, asymmetric shocks will 
occur less frequently (EC Commission, 1990). A monetary union will make trade within the 
union easier which implies more trade, more similarities in demand and make shocks more 
symmetric. Industrial goods are the most traded goods within the union, and the trade is based 
on economies of scale and product differentiation. This structure of trade will make shocks 
more symmetric, and will be reinforced by the removal of barriers in the single market.  
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The Krugman view states the opposite; in a monetary union, asymmetric shocks will occur 
more frequently (Krugman, 1991). This statement is based on the theory and analysis made by 
Krugman that with more trade follows regional concentration of industrial activities to exploit 
economies of scale, and to be closer to the final market. Shocks will then be sector specific 
and affect the relevant region. This implication supports the statement that shocks become 
more asymmetric in a monetary union and the costs of a monetary union will increase with 
increased trade.  
These views are illustrated in the following figure, where the European Commission view 
draw a positive relationship between trade integration and symmetry in shocks, and the 
Krugman view a negative relationship between trade integration and symmetry in shocks.  
  
Figure 7: Two views of trade effects to symmetry in shocks (De Grauwe, 2009) 
 
The European Commission view implies a benefit from more integrated markets, and the 
Krugman view implies costs of trade for a monetary union in the form or more asymmetric 
shocks. A presumption exists in favor for The European Commission view, but the Krugman 
view cannot be disputed due to the fact that borders become less important for production.  
3.1.2 Costs of differences 
Countries that are members of a monetary union need to have the same preferences of 
inflation and unemployment, same degree of centralization in labor market institutions, same 
legal systems and preferably the same growth rates to minimize the costs of countries losing 
their national monetary policy. The relevance of differences in these matters has been argued 
to what extent they are important, and they will be mentioned briefly. 
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3.1.2.1 Different preferences of inflation and unemployment 
In a monetary union, all countries have the same currency, and the exchange rate instrument is 
lost within the union. Countries within a union cannot devaluate the currency relative to one 
and other and the inflation rates has to be equal, this can be explained by the following 
equations (De Grauwe, 1975);  
Equation 3.1              
Equation 3.2                
Equation 3.3           
In these equations π is inflation rate, w is wage increase, q is growth in productivity and e is 
the rate of depreciation. Since the countries have the same currency, e is equal to 0 and cannot 
be changed and       . These preferences have to be equal in order for the monetary union 
to function, when there are differences in these preferences, one country has to accept more 
inflation and less unemployment than it normally would have, and the other has to accept less 
inflation and more unemployment than it normally would have, and these are is the costs of 
different preferences in a monetary union.  
3.1.2.2 Differences in labor market institutions 
There can be divergent wage and price developments if there are both countries with 
centralized and decentralized institutions in the same monetary union, even with the same 
disturbances (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  
Say there is a positive supply shock, with an increased price level, wages are expected to 
increase, but the size of the increase is different in countries with centralized labor unions 
than in countries with decentralized labor unions. The nominal wage increases more in 
decentralized labor unions because there are many unions, and they do not want their 
members to suffer from a lower increase, and they bargain for a higher nominal wage. In a 
centralized labor union, the nominal wage tends to increase with the inflation rate, and the real 
wage level will stay the same. Nominal wages in countries with decentralized unions tend to 
increase more than in countries with centralized unions when a positive supply shock occurs.  
3.1.2.3 Differences in legal systems 
Difference in legal systems can be in form of different protection mechanisms of banks, and 
mortgage can be different products across countries if some countries offer fixed rates to 
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maturity and others floating rates; the risk will be different. Different legal systems may also 
lead to differences in financial markets and risk of financial shocks is transmitted differently. 
There can also be differences in access to capital markets, in some countries, companies may 
have full access and can finance investment projects in capital markets, and these become 
more liquid than companies in countries where they only fund themselves through banks. 
When a company fund themselves through the capital market, an increase in interest rate will 
increase the price of financial products and lead to negative wealth effects. In countries where 
companies fund themselves through banks, an increase in interest rate will have an income 
effect and lead to less demand for consumption.  
3.1.2.4 Differences in growth rates 
When a country has a larger growth rate than another, the import in this country will be larger 
than the import in the other country, the net export will decrease and the country will lose 
competitiveness. The country with high growth rates can adjust by lowering the prices and 
make goods more competitive. Differences in growth rate are not a big problem.  
3.1.3 Sum of costs 
 In a monetary union, the individual countries loses their national monetary policy  
 Individual countries loses exchange rate mechanisms to correct for shocks 
 The loss of these instruments creates costs when asymmetric shocks occur, and when 
correcting for differences across countries 
 A common currency can create costs when/if the member countries find it difficult to 
adjust for disturbances 
 There are costs associated with the partial loss of independence in fiscal policy 
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3.2 Benefits 
There can be a lot of costs related to a common currency, but there can also be a lot of 
benefits. Such benefits can be increased economic efficiency in terms of no transaction costs, 
wealth gains from less uncertainty, elimination of exchange rate risk, increased trade and 
benefits related to the fact that the currency can become an international currency.  
3.2.1 No transaction costs 
There are both direct and indirect benefits associated with the elimination of transaction costs. 
Direct benefits are direct savings when transferring money. For the specific monetary union 
like the Eurozone, these direct benefits are estimated by the EU Commission to be between 13 
and 20 billion euros per year (EC Commission, 1990), the counterpart being the banking 
sector. Bank transfers between member countries are more expensive than within a country as 
the payment systems are not fully integrated. This is due to the fact that national systems are 
still in use, and transfers between countries follow a more expensive route, even though 
national payments are linked to the TARGET system.  
An indirect effect from no transaction costs of a common currency is that a common currency 
leads to more price transparency. This price transparency will benefit consumers in the way 
that price of similar products can be more easily compared, the competition between 
companies with similar products increases and may lead to reduced prices, which again 
benefits the consumer.  Price differences between countries are significant due to the fact that 
borders have a tendency to define markets. Studies conducted in the US found evidence of 
higher price differentials between US and Canada than within the US (Engel and Rogers, 
1995). The case of the US illustrates the benefits of having states relative to countries in a 
union. The euro contributes to economic integration and leads to financial integration and 
price convergence.  
3.2.2 Wealth gains due to less uncertainty 
When the risk of exchange rate changes is eliminated, there are opportunities for wealth gains. 
Such gains can result from the fact that there is less uncertainty about future revenue; a risk 
will be eliminated for risk adverse individuals who will seek more opportunities, and 
increases wealth. The exchange rate is not normally distributed, which represents a risk of 
large changes with low probability. There are situations where exchange rate can lead to 
increased wealth, e.g. for exporting companies that profit from changes in exchange rate.  
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3.2.3 Elimination of exchange rate risk related to growth  
It is assumed that the elimination of the exchange rate risk may reduce systematic risk, and 
the real interest rate is temporary lowered. With lower systematic risk, a lowered risk 
premium is required by investors on the same investment. Agents will use a lower discount 
rate on investment and more investments will be profitable, which again leads to increase in 
growth. Testing shows no effect in the real interest rate in the Eurozone after introducing the 
monetary union, and as follows, no change in growth (De Grauwe, 2009).  
3.2.4 Trade and openness of countries 
No transaction costs and no exchange rate uncertainty will increase trade, and according to the 
European Commission view introduced in 3.1.1.2, asymmetric shocks will be reduced. In 
addition to the benefits from the common currency, monetary unions also have benefits from 
more integrated financial markets and banking systems, which tend to increase trade further 
due to the fact that these mechanisms reduce cost of trading and facilities trade.  
No transaction costs in trade between countries using the same currency will reduce the 
probability of decision errors, these errors are based on the difficulties of trading with a 
country in another currency. The elimination of this type of decision error risk will make 
countries, which sell a lot of goods and services in the foreign market, more open and again 
lead to wealth gains.  
Figure 8 represents the relationship 
between openness (trade) and benefits.  
Openness is measured by the bilateral 
trade in percent of GDP of the country 
in focus, relative to other trading 
partners within the monetary union.  
More openness increases benefits from 
being in a monetary union. 
Figure 8: The relationship between trade and benefits in a 
monetary union (De Grauwe, 2009) 
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3.2.5 The euro as an international currency  
As mentioned in part 2.2, the euro is on its way to become an international currency. A 
benefit from the euro being an international currency is that is creates additional revenue to 
the issuer of the euro when it is used all over the world. Profit associated with this revenue 
goes to the government, and citizens will benefit in terms of reduced taxes, and a government 
spending remaining at the same level. A second benefit is when the international currency is 
held as international reserve, it can be used to finance the gap when government spending 
exceeds tax income, and the exchange rate risk is in the hands of foreign holders. A third 
benefit is increased activity in financial markets, banks and bond and equity market will 
attract business and create jobs.  
3.2.6 Symmetric shocks 
In part 3.1.1, asymmetric shocks are associated with more costs for two countries in a 
monetary union than two countries outside a monetary union. However, in the case of a 
symmetric shock, countries within a monetary union have more to gain than countries outside 
the union.  
Say there is a positive shock in aggregate demand, the central bank in a monetary union can 
increase the interest rate to control the shock in both countries, but it may be difficult for 
countries outside the union to coordinate such measures. If one country uses the exchange rate 
mechanism to correct the shock, it will be in expense of the other country, and if the other 
country responds by the same exchange rate change, there is a danger of a negative spiral, and 
the effect of the exchange rate changes will be reduced (De Grauwe, 2009).  
3.2.7 Sum of benefits 
 Decreased transaction costs and stimulated economic integration 
 Improved price stability 
 Increased trade 
 Wealth improvements by elimination of exchange rates risk  
 Increased competition due to price transparency 
 Financial, institutional and political integration 
 Benefits from the euro becoming an international currency 
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3.3 Net benefits 
The net benefits are found when costs and benefits of a monetary union are compared. Some 
factors are critical to produce net benefits, and are discussed in this section. These factors are 
the degree of openness of countries related to trade, degree of price and wage rigidities and 
labor mobility. Another aspect that is relevant is to look at the relationship between flexibility 
in labor markets and symmetry in shocks.  
3.3.1 Openness of countries and flexibility in labor markets  
There are both costs and benefits related to the openness of countries. Costs are discussed in 
3.1.1.1 and are the results of low ability to correct for asymmetric shocks with labor mobility 
and wage and price flexibility. Benefits related to more open economies in a monetary union 
is discussed in part 3.2.4 and can be partly related to the European Commission view that 
more trade will lead to asymmetric shocks being less frequent, and partly to increased profit 
and wealth from elimination of transaction shocks and price transparency.  
Figure 9 represents costs and benefits related to the openness of countries.  
The intersection between costs and 
benefits are the critical level of 
whether or not a country should join 
a monetary union with its trading 
partners.   
Countries with a large percent of 
trade are located to the right of the 
intersection; the benefits exceed the 
costs of joining a monetary union. 
Countries with low degree of trade 
are located to the left of the 
intersection, and have less to gain 
from joining a monetary union.  
 
The intersect point in this figures has been debated, and there are two extreme views; the 
monetarist view and the Keynesian view, in addition to the degree of flexibility.  
Figure 9: Benefits and costs in form of trade in a monetary 
union (De Grauwe, 2009) 
37 
 
The monetarist view states that national monetary policy is ineffective when it comes to 
correct for an asymmetric shock, whether the shock is permanent or temporary. The cost 
curve in this case is closer to the origin, and often steeper than the cost curve in the figure. 
More countries would benefit from joining a monetary union.  
In the Keynesian view, there are a lot of price and labor rigidities, and national monetary 
policy instruments are crucial to correct for asymmetric shocks. The cost curve is located 
further away from the origin in relation to the figure above, and fewer countries will gain 
from joining a monetary union.  
There is also the aspect of how flexible labor market and prices are. For countries with more 
flexibility in these markets, the costs of asymmetric shocks are lower due to the fact that these 
mechanisms make the adjustment process smoother and faster, the cost curve would shift to a 
level closer to the origin, and make a monetary union more beneficial. In the opposite case, 
costs of an asymmetric shock may be severe, and the cost curve will shift out, making 
monetary union less attractive to possible member countries. These effects are discussed in 
part 3.1.1.1.  
These factors together can be summed up in a figure illustrating the symmetry in shocks on 
the vertical axis and the degree of flexibility in labor market and prices on the horizontal axis 
and an optimal currency area can be located where benefits exceed costs.  
3.3.2 Symmetry in shocks and labor market flexibility 
The net benefits can be summed up in figure 10 that illustrates the relationship between the 
size and frequency of symmetric shocks and the degree of flexibility in the labor market. If 
the shocks are mostly asymmetric, there is great need for flexible wages and labor mobility to 
correct for the shock, if these mechanisms are not in place; the costs of joining a monetary 
union are substantial. When there are a lot of rigidities in wages and the labor force is not 
mobile, asymmetric shocks can be costly, and it is important that when joining a monetary 
union that shocks tend to affect countries symmetrically.  
Figure 10 illustrates the border between an optimal currency area, and a currency area which 
is not optimized. The vertical axis represents the degree of symmetry in demand and supply 
shocks, given by the correlation between growth rates of output and employment. The 
horizontal axis represents the degree of flexibility in the labor market; mobile labor force and 
flexible wages. The optimal currency area line (OCA-line) is where costs of joining a 
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monetary union equal the benefits. When having less degree of symmetric shock and low 
degree of flexibility, a country should not join a monetary union, on the other hand, if a 
country has the same types of shocks as the union, and/or large degree of flexibility in the 
labor market, a country should join a monetary union that both the union and the country can 
benefit from.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Sum of net benefits 
There are net benefits when;  
 When the countries are open/there are a lot of intra-EU trade 
 When monetary policy have little effect in the single country 
 When there is low degree of rigidities in prices and labor market 
 When the labor force is mobile 
 When there are few asymmetric shocks 
 When being in a monetary union increases wealth; for individual countries and for the 
Eurozone as a whole 
Figure 10: Optimal currency area (De Grauwe, 2009) 
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4. Analysis 
The analysis will start with a presentation and evaluation of the management of the monetary 
and fiscal policy for the Eurozone as a whole after the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
Secondly, theory of optimal currency areas will be applied to the members of the Eurozone, 
and it will be analyzed if the monetary union has led to net benefits. Third, the effects to 
member countries of losing their national monetary policy will be examined. Finally, the 
budget situation for each country will be evaluated.   
When analyzing the Eurozone as a whole, monthly data for the changing composition of the 
Eurozone will be used, due to the fact that ECB is in charge of the monetary policy of the 
countries that are members at a given point in time. However, when analyzing the individual 
countries, yearly data for the Eurozone consisting of 17 members throughout the period will 
be used, this is due to better comparison. Most of the data material is gathered from Eurostat, 
which is the European Commission’s release of statistical development concerning the 
Eurozone.  
 
4.1 The management of the monetary and fiscal policy in the 
Eurozone as a whole 
The primary objective of the monetary policy in the Eurozone is to keep inflation below but 
close to 2% in the medium term. Secondary objectives are output and employment. This 
section will be used to evaluate the management of the monetary policy in relation to the 
characteristics and developments addressed in part 2.4 of this thesis.  
The Maastricht Treaty (part 2.1) and the Stability and Growth pact (part 2.5) states criteria of 
fiscal situation to be eligible for a membership in the Eurozone and regulations of fiscal 
policy after joining the monetary union, respectively, that every member country has to 
follow. This section, in addition to an evaluation of the monetary policy, also evaluates the 
fiscal situation of the Eurozone as a whole in relation to these criteria and regulations.  
There are a lot of factors that play a role in the interest rate decision and to the economic 
development within and between countries; only the most important factors will be included 
in the following discussions. 
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4.1.1 Monetary policy in the Eurozone: the real economy 
It was decided, when planning and creating the Eurozone, that it should follow the German 
model of central banking. Practically, this means that the primary target of monetary policy is 
price stability as mentioned in part 2.3. Growth in prices was believed to be reflected in 
growth in money supply, and as a result, money supply was monitored and was prominent in 
monetary decisions until 2003. The following analysis will start by presenting inflation
2
 
(HICP), the target interest rate (the repo rate) and the growth in money supply
3
 (M3).  
Figure 11 presents the development of monthly changes in HICP (12 month average) and the 
changes in the target interest rate, from the start of ECBs reign.  
 
Figure 11: HICP and target rate (Eurostat, 2012 and ECB, n.d.) 
 
From the introduction of the euro in 1999, the inflation was close to the 2%-target until mid-
2007. Under and after the turmoil from the end of 2007 until today, inflation has deviated 
substantially from target relative to previous periods.   
                                      
2 HICP is the “Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices” and is similar to Consumer Price Indices (CPI) when it comes to the 
definition; measuring inflation faced by consumers, but the indices measure inflation with different aims and use different 
concepts or methods (appendix B). Source: Eurostat 
3 Money supply, M3, is seasonally adjusted and is the sum of currency in circulation, overnight deposits, deposits with an 
agreed maturity of up to two years, deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months, repurchase agreements,  money 
market fund shares/units and money market paper  and debt securities issued up to 2 years. Source: European Central Bank.  
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Even though inflation was close to target, and relatively stable, from 1999 to mid-2003, the 
target rate was raised 7 times from November 1999 to October 2000 (ECB, n.d.). The fact that 
the target rate was raised, even though inflation was stable during this period, can be 
interpreted as (1) the target rate was raised to keep inflation low and/or (2) the target rate was 
raised to stabilize for other factors in the economy. Before 2001, the global economy was in a 
high activity period with increased productivity due to new technology. Inflation is a lagging 
indicator, and to prevent future increase in inflation, the interest rate was raised in response to 
the increased activity in the economy.  
In March 2001, the “dotcom” bubble busted which resulted in an 8 month long recession in 
the US (NBER, 2012). This had an effect in most countries, and ECB responded, like most 
central banks, with lowering the target rate to correct for the negative effects of the bust. The 
target rate was lowered 7 times until it was set to 2%, followed by over two years of no 
change. During this 7 year period, the inflation remained close to 2% for the Eurozone as a 
whole, and effects of changes in economic activity was corrected before it made an effect to 
the inflation. ECB managed the monetary policy in a way that the primary objective of price 
stability was satisfied, and the monetary policy can be characterized as a success in the eyes 
of the ECB up until this point.  
In 2006 and 2007, the target rate was again raised despite low and stable inflation in the 
Eurozone. This was due to the positive prospects of the economy of increased growth in 
output, and employment as an effect of increased job creation (ECB, 2007). Although the 
target rate was raised, inflation exceeded target substantially from mid-2007 and grew until 
the financial crisis took the world economy by surprise in mid-2008. Both target rate and 
inflation fell dramatically as the asset bubble busted.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the target rate has remained low despite high 
inflation relative to target. Financial and fiscal imbalances are factors that have contributed to 
the decision of keeping the target rate low (ECB, 2012), together with slow recovery of the 
economic activity, debt and credit conditions and unemployment considerations.  
 
Money supply is mentioned in part 2.4 as an intermediate target to reach the ultimate target 
of inflation below but close to 2%. ECB projected that a yearly growth of money supply of 
4,5% implied a 2% increase in price level.  
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The following graph illustrates the growth in money supply in relation to changes in target 
interest rate and projected target of growth in money supply of 4,5%.  
 
Figure 12: Money supply and target rate (ECB, 2012 and ECB, n.d.) 
 
Due to the scope of explaining the reactions of target interest rate changes mentioned above, 
the discussion of the reactions in the target rate related to growth in money supply will be 
brief. An increase in the interest rate implies an increase in the cost of money.  
During the years 1999-2000, the growth in money supply was high relative to the target 
projected of 4,5%. As the target rate was raised, money became more expensive, and as a 
result, the demand for money went down and the growth of money supply slowed down. After 
the dotcom bust in 2001, target rate went down and money supply increased to stimulate the 
economy in the recession.  
This low level of interest rate during the mid-2000s is the main factor that drove the 
increasing growth in money supply from 2005 (ECB, 2006), the increasing money supply was 
seen as a risk of future inflation increase and as a respond to the high increase in money 
supply, the target rate was increased. The increase in the target rate was not sufficient, and the 
growth in M3 was stimulated by a flat yield curve; low/no difference between short-term and 
long-term interest rates for bonds of the same credit quality, and an increasing interest in 
financial assets in the Eurozone by non-EU residents (ECB, 2007) The high increase in 
money growth continued despite the continuous increase in the target interest rate, and they 
both peaked in 2007/2008. After the financial crisis, both interest rate and growth in money 
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supply have been low, even a decline in money supply can be seen in 2009/2010, which is 
mainly due to downward impact of a steep yield curve (ECB, 2010). The most recent 
observations of a slight increase in growth of money supply is due to an easing of 
deleveraging pressure on banks, the risk of sudden deleveraging has declined (ECB, 2012).  
In relation to the first-pillar of the monetary policy, the growth in money supply was projected 
to be close to 4,5%, but the actual average growth has been 6,1% from 1999 to 2011. In 2003, 
the role of money growth was de-emphasized due to its failure to predict inflation. Before 
2003, growth in money supply and target rate went in different directions; a negative 
relationship, and after 2003 movements in target rate and growth of money supply have been 
similar; a positive relationship. The graphical results cannot be used to make assumptions of 
causality, and they most likely have an effect on each other or they are both endogenous and 
affected by other factors in the economy. They can be affected by each other in the following 
ways; an increase in growth of money supply can be seen as a threat to price stability and the 
target rate can be increased to stimulate stability in price, on the other hand, an increase in 
target rate increases the cost of money, and the demand for money declines, which in terms 
reduces money supply in the economy. It must also be mentioned that an increase in the target 
rate is not the only way to dampen growth in money supply, the central bank can also reduce 
the supply of liquidity by using other instruments such as standing facilities and minimum 
reserves mentioned in part 2.4.2. The decision of de-emphasizing M3 when making monetary 
decisions is not reflected in the graph.  
The only time period where growth in money supply have had a clear effect on target rate 
decisions is in 2006/2007, when growth in money supply had increased for over a year, and 
was seen as a risk of growth in price levels.  
 
If not interfering with price stability, secondary targets like output and employment
4
 
(sometimes unemployment
5
) can be emphasized in an interest rate decision. These real 
                                      
4 The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total population of 
the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labor Force Survey. Employed population consists of those persons who 
during the reference week did any work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which 
they were temporarily absent. Source: Eurostat 
5 The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percent of the labor force based on International Labor 
Office (ILO) definition. The labor force is the total number of people employed or unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise 
persons aged 15 to 74 who are without work during the reference week, are available to start work within the next two weeks 
and have been actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months. 
Source: Eurostat 
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economic indicators can only be affected by monetary policy in the short-run, in the long run 
they are fixed and can only be affected by structural changes e.g. changes in legislation and 
regulation, and/or changes in productivity by e.g. new technology (the monetarist view).  
The output gap tells us about the activity in the economy. When GDP (total output) is larger 
than trend, there is a high economic activity period (a positive output gap) and when GDP is 
lower than trend, the country experience a low economic activity period (a negative output 
gap). When the output gap increases (trough to peak in GDP), the economy is in expansion; a 
boom, and when GDP declines (peak to trough in GDP), the economy is in recession; a bust.  
Equation 4.1:              
    
  
 
Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between yearly target interest rate (the level of December 
of the respective year), unemployment and output gap. 
 
Figure 13: The relationship between target rate, unemployment and output gap (ECB, n.d., Eurostat, 2012 
and OECD, 2011) 
 
As indicated above, the interest rate was set as a result of the activity in the economy, and 
when looking at figure 13, this tends to be true. The output gap was positive from 1999 to 
2001 mostly due to an increase in new technology, negative from 2002 to 2005 which was the 
recovery period after the dotcom bust in 2001, positive from 2006 to 2008 due to good future 
prospects and negative after 2009 due to the financial crisis. Unemployment has been moving 
in the opposite direction, slightly lagging, which is in line with economic theory.  
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It can also be interesting to look at correlation between the factors illustrated in figure 13, 
replacing unemployment with employment because unemployment tends to be lagging.  
  Employment Output gap Target rate 
Employment 1,00     
Output gap -0,37 1,00   
Target rate -0,55 0,91 1,00 
Table 1: Correlation between employment, output gap and target rate 
 
The interest rate changes are highly correlated with economic activity, given by the output 
gap, with a correlation coefficient of 0,91; in  91% of the periods, interest rate and output gap 
went in the same direction at the same time. This result must be interpreted with caution as 
the number of observations is relatively low due to the use of yearly data, there is also the 
endogeneity question, and as follows, causality. Employment seems to have a negative 
correlation with both output gap and target rate which does not make sense due to the fact that 
in periods of high economic activity, more jobs are created which tend to lead to higher 
employment.  
 
Even though ECB has been successful in reaching their target in periods of relatively stable 
conditions, and even under the 2001-recession, some criticism is relevant. There were no 
threats to price stability in the two years of low and unchanged target rate in 2003-2005 in the 
eyes of ECB (ECB, 2005), but in the same report it is stated that money supply had been 
growing increasingly and could cause a risk of price pressure. If the target rate had been 
raised earlier in response to the increase in money supply, it could have dampened the high 
economic growth in the preceding years, and maybe also some of the effects from the crisis.  
In times of stable prices, before 2007, ECB have been focusing on stabilizing output and 
unemployment. Under and after the financial crisis in 2008, inflation, growth in money supply 
and output gap all fell, and unemployment increased. Due to this symmetric effect, the interest 
rate was used to stimulate all these effects at the same time. The only period where ECB had a 
choice between price stability and output stabilization was 2011, where inflation exceeded the 
2% target, and the output gap was negative. The low economic activity combined with high 
unemployment and fiscal instabilities have resulted in the decision of continuing to keep the 
target rate at a low level. Despite the low interest rates during the mid-2000s, the management 
of the monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole has been satisfactory.  
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4.1.2 Fiscal policy: the budgetary situation for the Eurozone as a whole  
The Maastricht Treaty states criteria to join the European Monetary Union, and among the 
criteria, there are two that related to the budgetary situation; government debt must be kept 
lower than 60% of GDP, and government budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. The 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is making sure that member countries follow these criteria 
even after becoming a member of the union by e.g. fining countries that have budget deficits 
higher than 3% of GDP. The following analysis will present budgetary statistics for the 
Eurozone as a whole and relate this situation to the criteria in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Government debt and budget deficit are nominal gross values in percent of nominal GDP.  
The evaluation will start by looking at the relationship between growth in real GDP and 
budget deficit, due to the fact that the budget deficit tends to increase when GDP declines. 
This relationship was presented in appendix A, corresponding to part 2.5.2, by the equation;  
Equation 4.2 
   
 
 (   ) 
When GDP increases, the budget deficit will be reduced, given that government spending (G) 
and tax income (T) stay the same. If a country has a budget deficit (g > t), the reduction in tax 
rate will be lower than the reduction in government spending in percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 14: The development of growth in real GDP and budget deficit (Eurostat, 2012) 
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When looking at actual data of real GDP and the budget deficit for the Eurozone as a whole in 
figure 14, the relationship in equation 4.2 tends to be true. Budget deficit moves in the 
opposite direction of real GDP. This co-movement can be measured by correlation;  
  Growth in real GDP Budget deficit 
Growth in real GDP 1   
Budget deficit -0,72 1 
Table 2: Correlation between growth of real GDP and budget deficit 
 
In 72% of the cases, GDP growth and budget deficit moves in the opposite direction at the 
same time. This implies that, in most cases, when there is an increase in GDP growth, there is 
a decrease in budget deficit. These are both endogenous and affected by other factors, but to 
what extent they move in the opposite direction can be interesting to notice.  
Figure 15 presents the development of budget deficit in % of GDP during the euro-period for 
the Eurozone as a whole, and the Maastricht criteria of a budget deficit limit of 3% of GDP.  
 
Figure 15: Government budget deficit in % of GDP in relation to the Maastricht Treaty 
 
The budget deficit was under the critical limit for the Eurozone as a whole until the financial 
crisis in 2008 (except for 2003 when it just about exceeded the limit). After the financial 
crisis, the budget deficit has been over 3% of GDP, with a peak in 2009. In 2011, the budget 
deficit was falling, and is hopefully soon to be back under the 3% limit. Even though the 
budget deficit situation looks good for the Eurozone as a whole, this is far from the case of the 
individual member countries, which will be presented later.  
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Figure 16 presents the development of government debt in % of GDP during the euro-period 
for the Eurozone as a whole, and the Maastricht criteria of a government debt limit of 60%.  
 
Figure 16: Government debt in % of GDP in relation to the Maastricht Treaty (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
The government debt level has exceeded the 60% of GDP limit over the whole period, but it 
has been stable. From 1999 to 2008, the debt level has been close to, and mostly below, 70%, 
but increasing after 2008. In 2011, the debt ratio was close to 90%, which implies an increase 
of 20% in only three years. The increasing debt level can be due to the increasing budget 
deficit because countries are using debt to finance it, it can be due to increasing cost of debt 
(increasing nominal and real interest rates) and also lower inflation.  
This increase in debt can become very costly for the Eurozone. Some member countries 
increased their debt to finance the budget deficit that resulted from the financial crisis, and 
with an increasing debt level, the credit worthiness of the country was lowered, followed by 
increasing interest rates due to increases in risk premiums and an increased risk of default. All 
Eurozone members must contribute to finance a bail-out so that countries with high debt and 
risk of default do not go bankrupt.  
All in all, the Eurozone’s aggregate budget deficit has been below 3%, except for under and 
after the financial crisis in 2008, which is understandable and accepted. However, the 
aggregate government debt level has never met the 60% debt ratio criterion, and this is debt 
that has the potential to become very costly. Measures to decrease the debt ratio must be 
made, e.g. a centralized government budget for the Eurozone or Eurobonds, both will be 
discussed in part 6.  
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4.2 Net benefits in relation to OCA theory 
A monetary union forms an optimal currency area when benefits of being in a monetary union 
exceed the costs. Net benefits can be a result of (1) degree of openness/trade, (2) symmetry in 
shocks, (3) and flexible labor markets in terms of wage and labor force. Effects of the loss of 
national monetary policy to individual countries will be analyzed in 4.3.  
4.2.1 Openness and trade 
Since the 1980s, the monetarist view has gained adherents, and due to the belief that national 
monetary policy is ineffective when it comes to correct for asymmetric shocks, the degree of 
openness needed to benefit from the monetary union is at a lower level, which makes the 
union profitable for more countries. This contributed to the realization of EMU in the 1990s. 
Country Export Import Total activity 
Belgium 67 % 61 % 128 % 
Slovakia 70 % 58 % 128 % 
Czech Republic 62 % 52 % 115 % 
Estonia 50 % 62 % 112 % 
Hungary 61 % 51 % 111 % 
Slovenia 50 % 48 % 98 % 
Netherlands 61 % 33 % 94 % 
Lithuania 40 % 41 % 82 % 
Latvia 31 % 45 % 76 % 
Luxembourg 30 % 39 % 69 % 
Bulgaria 33 % 36 % 69 % 
Malta 17 % 50 % 67 % 
Austria 30 % 35 % 65 % 
Poland 28 % 28 % 56 % 
Ireland 34 % 21 % 55 % 
Romania 23 % 29 % 53 % 
Germany 24 % 22 % 47 % 
Denmark 22 % 21 % 43 % 
Portugal 18 % 25 % 43 % 
Sweden 19 % 22 % 42 % 
Finland 16 % 19 % 36 % 
France 13 % 17 % 30 % 
Cyprus 5 % 24 % 29 % 
Spain 14 % 14 % 28 % 
Italy 13 % 14 % 27 % 
United Kingdom 11 % 13 % 24 % 
Greece 5 % 11 % 16 % 
Table 3: Intra EU export and import in % of GDP (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
Table 3 illustrates the openness given by intra-union export and import to EU countries (% of 
GDP) in 2011, and to illustrate total activity, these are summed up. 
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Export and import are summed into “total activity” to present a better picture of the trade 
integration. When looking at net export, the values are more similar, and are not representable 
for trade in total, and do not give any information about the degree of trade in the European 
Union; the net export of countries with low export and import are relatively similar to 
countries with both high export and import. The calculations are made by dividing nominal 
intra-EU export and import by nominal GDP, respectively.  
The euro has generated new trade flows in the Eurozone, which has expanded the choice of 
goods and services, and increased consumer wealth. From table 3, the result of trade activity 
varies a lot among the EU countries.  
The European Union and the euro were created with a vision of increased trade within 
Europe, to stimulate integration. Of the 11 countries that were first introduced to the euro, 
only 5 of these have total intra-EU trade of over 50% of GDP; the Benelux-countries 
(Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), Ireland and Austria. The other 6 countries have 
total EU trade activity between 25% and 50% of GDP; Germany, Portugal, Finland, France, 
Spain and Italy. One would believe that these countries were the ones with most trade due to 
the fact that those were the main drivers behind the EU and the EMU. Other countries with 
total EU trade between 25% and 50% of GDP are Denmark, Sweden and Cyprus.  
The countries with most intra trade in the European Union, along with the Benelux-countries, 
are actually the Eastern European countries and the new EMU members; Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria (outside the Eurozone), and 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia and Malta (new EMU members). 
United Kingdom and Greece are the countries with the lowest degree of trade, with less than 
25% trade activity of GDP with other EU countries.  
High level of trade in the Eastern European and new EMU members may be due to the fact 
that they are poorer, and costs of importing from/exporting to EU countries are lower than to 
import from/export to countries outside the EU. The location can also be a relevant factor; 
they trade with countries closer to one and other. Countries with a lower degree of trade 
within the European Union are mostly western countries, richer countries, and may be trading 
more with countries outside the EU (the US, Asia and Norway) to stimulate the demand for 
specific goods and to seek a broader range of products from all over the world.   
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When looking at export, the countries around the Mediterranean Sea tend to have less export 
than other countries in the European Union; Malta, Cyprus, Spain, Italy and Greece. These 
countries have limited national resources, and the main exports are fruits, vegetables, wines, 
textiles and clothing, machinery, and tobacco in Cyprus, (Trading Economics, 2012, and 
Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2012). The low degree of trade is mainly due to the limitations 
in national resources to export and long traditions of production and usage of local food. 
These factors must not be mistaken as low degree or will of integration. For Greece and Italy, 
the benefits of less inflation ware more important than the trade benefits when joining the 
monetary union (De Grauwe, 2009). 
For open countries, like the Eastern European and the Benelux-countries, the trade benefits 
from a membership in EMU are grand. Less open countries like Greece and Italy had other 
incentives for joining the union, e.g. control over their large level of inflation. When it comes 
to total activity presented in table 3, it is not certain that 2011 is a representative year when it 
comes to trade, due effects from the financial crisis and the financial and fiscal instabilities 
present in the Eurozone. It is also difficult to determine how much trade it takes to generate 
net benefits in a monetary union.  
4.2.2 Symmetry in shocks 
Two views of the effect of an increase in trade to the symmetry in shocks were stated in part 
3.1.1.2; The European Commission and the Krugman view. This thesis will not analyze the 
frequency of asymmetric shocks after joining a monetary union, but find the degree of 
symmetry in shocks between the member countries. This symmetry in shocks can be found by 
taking the correlation between each member country and the Eurozone of growth in real GDP, 
employment and demand.  
The symmetry analysis consist of three correlation analyses, the correlation of growth in real 
total domestic demand for all Eurozone countries and the Eurozone aggregate for the years 
1998-2011 (OECD, 2011), the correlation of growth in employment between all Eurozone 
countries and the Eurozone aggregate for the years 1998-2011 (Eurostat, 2012) and the 
correlation of growth in real GDP between all Eurozone countries and the Eurozone aggregate 
for the years 1996-2011 (Eurostat, 2012). Table 4 presents each country’s correlation with the 
Eurozone aggregate, and not the correlation between single countries.  
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The degree of symmetry in shocks between member countries and the Eurozone; 
Correlation with the Eurozone 
Growth of;  real GDP Employment Demand 
Belgium 92 % 49 % 80 % 
Germany 90 % 36 % 74 % 
Estonia 81 % 54 % 68 % 
Ireland 75 % 92 % 88 % 
Greece 47 % 50 % 56 % 
Spain 87 % 91 % 88 % 
France 97 % 70 % 97 % 
Italy 97 % 87 % 93 % 
Cyprus 80 % 67 %   
Luxembourg 91 % -40 % 81 % 
Malta 55 % 24 %   
Netherlands 91 % 67 % 88 % 
Austria 94 % 47 % 87 % 
Portugal 75 % 81 % 66 % 
Slovenia 88 % 45 % 80 % 
Slovakia 57 % 44 % 36 % 
Finland 96 % 88 % 83 % 
Average 82 % 56 % 78 % 
Table 4: Symmetry in shocks 
 
Permanent shocks to the economy can be reflected in real GDP, and temporary shocks can be 
reflected in demand. Countries that are not in a monetary union have a higher probability of 
less correlation due to the fact that different monetary policies can be the cause of asymmetric 
shocks. In this case the countries are all in the same monetary union and are affected by the 
same monetary policy after they joined, which affect the countries in a similar way and makes 
shocks more symmetric. Even though the same monetary policy leads to the correlation 
factors being endogenous, there is more symmetry in a monetary union.  
Each member country’s growth in real GDP is highly correlated with the Eurozone aggregate. 
The Eurozone aggregate is growth in total real GDP for all members of the monetary union, 
and the biggest countries in terms of GDP will as follows have a large correlation. The sample 
consists of yearly data, which implies few observations. The results may be stronger in this 
case, and represent a larger correlation, compared to a larger data set. Disregarded the fact of 
a small sample, the matrix shows large correlation in growth of real GDP. The exceptions 
from very large correlation are Greece, Malta and Slovakia (the other countries have a 
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correlation coefficient over 0,75), but the correlation is still strong. When it comes to growth 
in real GDP, the correlation with the Eurozone can be characterized as relatively strong for all 
member countries, and shocks to real GDP can be said to be very symmetric.  
When it comes to employment, the correlation is not as high as for real GDP, but still, it can 
be characterized as high correlations. The exception in this case is Luxembourg, where the 
correlation is negative and may be due to the extensive protection of employees (Lowtax, 
2012). Germany, Malta, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia have lower correlation than the other 
countries. Germany is the highest weighted country in the Eurozone aggregate, and the 
relatively low degree of correlation can be interpreted that other countries are moving in the 
opposite direction of Germany, and it can be difficult to make unambiguous conclusions 
about symmetry in employment. The correlation coefficients must be interpreted with caution 
due to the small sample size. Shocks in employment can be characterized as relatively 
symmetric.  
The correlation of growth in demand between the member countries and the Eurozone are 
high for most countries, only Slovakia has low correlation. Data for Malta and Cyprus were 
unavailable. Shocks in real demand tend to be symmetric within the Eurozone.  
All in all, shocks can be characterized as more symmetric than asymmetric, and symmetry in 
shocks to real GDP and real demand is higher than symmetry in shocks to employment. This 
can be due to the fact that Germany has more regulations of the labor market, and the ability 
to create new jobs independent from the market situation. The results must be interpreted with 
caution, and criticism can be raised to the small sample sizes.  
4.2.3 Labor market flexibility; mobility of labor and wage rigidities 
For countries where the mobility of labor is limited and the flexibility in wages is low, a 
membership in a monetary union can be very costly when asymmetric shocks occur. Due to 
separate policy regimes, institutional differences in labor markets have accumulated over the 
years. The reason for the limited mobility of labor may be due to language barriers, cultural 
differences and affiliation of own country and culture.  
It is difficult to determine the degree of flexibility for the member countries in the Eurozone, 
the flexibility in labor markets is not easily quantified, and difficult to analyze. For countries 
that have a centralized wage bargaining, the wage tends to be less flexible when it comes to 
flexibility in the upward direction, but more flexible when it comes to downward flexibility. 
54 
 
Decentralized wage bargaining is more flexible when it comes to increasing wages due to a 
higher pressure from unions to increase wage as a result of higher productivity, but less 
flexible when it comes to decreasing the wage level.  
My overall evaluation of the labor markets in the Eurozone is that there is a low degree of 
flexibility. This can be a result of several factors as stated above, such as cultural differences 
and language barriers. In comparison with the US, where the flexibility is much higher, 
language and cultures are not major obstacles, and in addition they have a different mentality 
when it comes to labor mobility; they live where they work, in oppose to the Eurozone; they 
work where they live.  
4.2.4 Symmetry in shocks and flexibility in labor markets compared 
Isolating all other effects, when placing the Eurozone in relation to the OCA line in figure 10, 
only considering symmetry in shocks and flexibility in labor markets, I would place the 
Eurozone just above the OCA line. The levels of symmetry among member countries are 
relatively high, but the flexibility in labor markets is relatively low.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Eurozone in relation to the OCA line 
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4.3 Effects from the introduction of euro in the member countries  
This section will address different effects of the introduction of euro and the loss of national 
monetary policy for the individual countries. In countries where the loss of monetary policy 
has not been relatively costly, the monetary policy had little effect on the economy in the 
country before joining the monetary union, and generates higher net benefits, which is in line 
with the monetarist view, mentioned in part 3.3.1 and 4.2.1. Even though it is still too early to 
determine whether the membership in the EMU and the loss of national monetary policy have 
had a significant impact on output, inflation and unemployment, this section will address the 
effects up until 2011. The results must be interpreted with caution, as the sample size is small 
and the monetary union is still young.   
4.3.1 Desired interest rate  
The two main costs and losses by joining a monetary union are the national interest rate and 
the exchange rate as instruments to stabilize the economy. This section will present a 
comparison of desired interest rates (target rates) between each member country calculated by 
the Taylor rule, to find the deviation between actual target rate and the optimal target rate for 
each country, theoretically.  
Desired interest rates are calculated for the Eurozone countries, including the Eurozone as a 
whole, by using the simple Taylor rule stated in equation 4.3 (Taylor, 1993).  
Equation 4.3      ̅     
     (      
 )     (      
 ) 
The equation consists of the real equilibrium interest rate,  ̅ at full employment, inflation 
target,    and potential GDP,   .    and    are positive parameters. Taylor postulated that  ̅ = 
  
  = 2, and    =    = 0,5.  
Taylor’s inflation parameter has been discussed to be too low, and that it should be larger than 
1 in order to lead to stable inflation (Alesina et al., 2001). It should be larger than 1 so that 
when inflation exceeds target, nominal interest rate should increase by more than inflation 
rate to increase the real interest rate. Only when increasing the real interest rate, inflation can 
be brought back to target. Alesina et al. found the parameters for the Eurozone to be    = 1,5 
and     = 0,5. The central banks reaction function can be formulated as in equation 4.4. 
Equation 4.4               (     )      (      
 ) 
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Table 5 includes each country’s relative size, the inflation rate of each country in 2011 
(Eurostat, 2012), the output gap for 2011 (OECD, 2011) and the calculated desired interest 
rate. The relative size is calculated by dividing the country’s real GDP by the Eurozone real 
GDP for all members in 2011. The relative size of Malta and Cyprus are 0,1% and 0,2%, 
respectively, these two countries are not included as output gaps for these are not available.  
Country Relative size Inflation Output gap Desired interest rate 
Greece 2,1 % 3,10 % -15,00 % -1,85 % 
Ireland 1,8 % 1,20 % -7,79 % -1,09 % 
Slovenia 0,4 % 2,10 % -3,53 % 2,38 % 
France 21,5 % 2,30 % -3,42 % 2,74 % 
Spain 11,1 % 3,10 % -4,94 % 3,18 % 
Finland 2,0 % 3,30 % -4,57 % 3,67 % 
Eurozone   2,70 % -2,57 % 3,76 % 
Germany  27,7 % 2,50 % -0,79 % 4,36 % 
Italy 16,7 % 2,90 % -1,74 % 4,48 % 
Netherlands 6,6 % 2,50 % -0,14 % 4,68 % 
Portugal 1,8 % 3,60 % -2,66 % 5,07 % 
Luxembourg 0,4 % 3,70 % -2,85 % 5,12 % 
Austria 3,2 % 3,60 % -1,82 % 5,49 % 
Belgium 3,8 % 3,50 % -1,50 % 5,50 % 
Estonia 0,1 % 5,10 % -3,89 % 6,70 % 
Slovakia 0,7 % 4,10 % 1,10 % 7,70 % 
Table 5: Desired interest rates for all Eurozone members in 2011 
 
The desired interest rates are ranged from lowest to highest. Germany, France, Italy and Spain 
have the largest real GDP and furthermore larger weights; they have more influence on the 
theoretical interest rate decision.  
For Greece and Ireland, the desired interest rates calculated from the Taylor rule are negative, 
which is mainly due to the high negative output gap. Countries in the other end of the table 
have the need for a relatively large interest rate due to their high inflation. Inflation has been 
well above target for almost every country, with the exception of Ireland, but at the same time 
the output gaps have been negative in 2011 for all Eurozone countries, except for Slovakia. 
There is currently a trade-off situation in the interest rate decision between inflation and 
output. As mentioned in 4.1.1, ECB have emphasized output in 2011, along with other factors 
like employment and the fiscal situation in the Eurozone, which has led to the target interest 
rate being held at a low level, and was between 1% and 1,5% throughout 2011 (compared to 
the calculated target interest rate of 3,76%). This deviation is an example of the fact that some 
57 
 
rules and models for the economy are simple, and should never be used for something other 
than a cross-reference, or to increase the understanding of reaction functions.  
The gap between desired interest rates between Eurozone member countries is 9,55%. 
Countries in the high end and countries in the low end can be subject of unfortunate interest 
rate decisions. Countries in the low end need to be stimulated to increase price level or 
economic activity, and the high activity/high inflation in countries in the high end need to be 
dampened. The European Central Bank cannot do both at the same time, and there will always 
be losers when it comes to interest rate decisions.  
In the long run, it is believed by monetarists and stated in macroeconomic theory that 
monetary policy does not have an effect on the real economy, which means that the loss of 
national monetary policy is not a severe cost. Consequences in the short term of e.g. low 
interest rate when there is a need for higher interest rate can help “fuel the fire” in the 
economy; the prospect for the future is good, expectations about the future by investors, 
increase investment and animal spirit; market values can exceed fundamental values in stocks, 
and create bubbles in house prices and other assets. These expectations and the increased 
demand cause pressure on prices, in can result in increased inflation. Also increase in output, 
and risk caused by bubbles.  
The following sections will describe the situation of output, employment, growth in GDP and 
the fiscal situation for all 17 members of the Eurozone, and will be related to the desired 
interest rates in table 5. 
4.3.2 The common currency’s effect on inflation  
The largest cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of national monetary policy; these 
costs are in terms of higher volatility in inflation and output. This section will locate effects 
from the loss of national monetary policy in terms of volatility, to the extent inflation and 
output deviates from inflation target and normal output, respectively. If the mean absolute 
deviation from inflation target/normal output is lower after, relative to before the introduction 
of the euro, these countries have had benefits of more stable inflation/output, and if the 
deviation from inflation target/normal output is higher after, relative to before the introduction 
of the euro, the loss of monetary policy can be interpreted to be costly in terms of increased 
volatility in inflation and output.   
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Instead of presenting the results graphically, they are presented in a table, which is illustrative 
when it comes to volatility. The results are presented by MAD: Mean Absolute Deviation; 
Equation 4.5  
∑ |   –   ̂|
 
   
 
 
Instead of deviation from the sample average, it can in this case be more illustrative to take 
the deviation from inflation target, 2%, to locate volatility effects of centralized monetary 
policy.  
Equation 4.6  
∑          
 
   
 
 
The analysis is based on monthly inflation given by annual rate of change (Eurostat, 2012). 
Although data were only available from 1997, which implies a relatively small sample size for 
the years before introducing the euro and uncertainties when it comes to whether or not these 
24 months (for 11 countries) are representable for a period of “normal” inflation, the results 
are very interesting and can be seen as indicative.  
Table 6 presents the mean absolute deviation from the inflation target; 
Mean absolute deviation from the inflation target (2%) 
Period/country 1997-2011 Before euro After euro Difference  
Eurozone 0,56 0,55 0,56 -0,01  
Belgium 0,92 0,80 0,94 -0,15  
Germany  0,75 0,93 0,72 0,20  
Estonia 3,34 3,97 2,94 0,43  
Ireland 1,52 0,63 1,65 -1,02  
Greece 1,58 1,86 1,49 0,37  
Spain 1,11 0,32 1,23 -0,91  
France 0,66 1,02 0,61 0,41  
Italy 0,57 0,21 0,62 -0,41  
Cyprus 1,23 1,09 1,56 -0,46  
Luxembourg 1,20 0,82 1,26 -0,44  
Malta 1,13 1,03 0,40 -0,37  
Netherlands 0,79 0,43 0,84 -0,41  
Austria 0,75 1,00 0,71 0,29  
Portugal 1,08 0,43 1,18 -0,74  
Slovenia 3,22 4,19 1,39 2,80  
Slovakia 3,70 4,28 1,58 2,70  
Finland 0,90 0,71 0,93 -0,22  
Table 6: Inflation and mean absolute deviation from inflation target 
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The table is divided into two parts, and starts by presenting the MAD for the whole period, 
January 1997 – April 2012. Secondly, the mean absolute deviation from inflation target is 
divided into the period before and after the introduction of the euro for all member countries; 
1997-1998 and 1999-2012 for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria, 1997-2000 and 2001-2012 for Greece, 1997-
2006 and 2007-2012 for Slovenia, 1997-2007 and 2008-2012 for Malta and Cyprus and 1997-
2010 and 2011-2012 for Estonia. These definitions of “before euro” and “after euro” will 
apply in every table and analysis where “before euro” and “after euro” are mentioned.  
The first column gives the mean absolute deviation from target over the whole period 
analyzed. The Eurozone as a whole has a relatively low deviation from inflation target with an 
average deviation of 0,56%, which is consistent with the conclusion in 4.1.1 that in terms of 
main target of the monetary policy for the Eurozone (inflation below, but close to 2%), the 
ECB’s management of the monetary policy has been satisfactory.  
Countries with relatively low degree of deviation from target are Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands and Austria with average deviation from target of less than 0,8%, these are also 
the countries with the largest weights in the Eurozone aggregate in terms of real GDP.  
The countries with most volatile inflation, in terms of deviation from the Eurozone inflation 
target of 2%, are the newer Eurozone members; Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia. The average 
deviation from target is over 3%, and this result is not surprising due to the fact that they are 
relatively new to the Eurozone and the volatility might have been very high before they joined 
the Eurozone due to facts like e.g. no inflation regulations or another inflation target. Other 
countries with relatively high deviation from the inflation target are Ireland and Greece with a 
deviation close to 1,5%, and also Spain, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal with over 
1% deviation from target in average. Ireland’s high degree of deviation from target is due to 
high inflation in the first half of 2000s and deflation in 2009 and 2010, and Greece’s deviation 
from the inflation target is due to overall high inflation over the whole period.   
The fact that the average deviation in the Eurozone is the lowest deviation from target, 
implies that some countries exceed the inflation target and some countries have inflation 
below, but the Eurozone inflation makes the situation look better than it actually is; the actual 
deviation from target in individual countries are higher, but the Eurozone aggregate is close to 
2% with the highest weighted countries Germany and France contributing to the downward 
pressure of Eurozone aggregate inflation and the other countries to an upward pressure.  
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To find out whether the membership in the monetary union has been costly or beneficial in 
terms of inflation, the time series can be divided into two parts; before euro and after euro. 
When taking the mean absolute deviation from target before euro and compare it to the 
deviation after euro, it is possible to make indicative feedback on the effect of the loss of 
monetary policy.  
For some countries, the effects of being in a monetary union has been positive; the average 
deviation from inflation has been reduced; Slovakia and Slovenia are countries with the 
highest positive effects (respectively 2,7% and 2,8% closer to target in average over the years 
in the Eurozone). Other countries with positive inflation effects after introducing euro have 
been Greece and France, and a small positive effect in Austria. Estonia also has a positive 
effect, but due to facts of its recent membership and the global financial crisis, it is impossible 
to draw any conclusions about whether or not this positive effect is due to the membership in 
the Eurozone or not.  
Some countries have had no substantial change in the average deviation from target, such as 
Belgium, Finland and Germany (2% ± 0,2% in average).  
A country that experiences more volatility in inflation after joining the Eurozone, and where 
the membership has been costly because it cannot use effective instruments to control 
inflation e.g. the interest rate, is Ireland (over 1% increase in deviation from target after its 
membership). Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands and Malta have 
experienced an increase in deviation from inflation target of between 0,3 and 1%.  
A test to find if there has been an overall positive or negative effect of the euro to all member 
countries is a t-test. This is a paired sample t-test for the average deviation before and after the 
introduction of euro. The null hypothesis, H0, and the alternative hypothesis, H1, can be 
formulated as follows, where   ̅̅̅̅  is the average deviation from inflation target; 
Equation 4.7  H0:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro =   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
Equation 4.8 H1:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro ≠   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
When performing a paired two sample t-test (appendix C) of the average deviation from 
inflation target before and after the introduction of euro, the result is that I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 10% significance level and there is no difference in deviation from 
inflation target before and after the introduction of the euro. Due to the small sample size, a 
10% significance level is appropriate, (p-value = 0,6507) (appendix C (a)).  
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The result, of no significant difference in inflation before and after the introduction of euro in 
the respective countries, must be interpreted with caution. The result of this analysis can only 
lead to the conclusion that there is no difference in inflation for all Eurozone members as a 
group, but it does not say anything about the situation for the individual countries. Due to the 
fact that the Eurozone does not have mechanisms to smooth inflation differences between 
single countries, the countries that have experienced an increase in inflation also have more 
costs associated with the membership in the monetary union; the loss of national monetary 
policy for these countries are costly. Ireland, Spain and Portugal have had the largest 
increases in average inflation after joining the monetary union, if this increase is significant is 
not possible to test, but a deviation from target of close to 1% every month (annual rate of 
change) can be discussed to be severe.  
The desired interest rates calculated in table 5 for Ireland, Spain and Portugal are -1,09%, 
3,18% and 5,07%, respectively. The actual target rate has been between 1% and 1,5% in 
2011, which is high for Ireland, and low for Spain and Portugal (based on the calculations of 
desired interest rate). This degree of deviation in the level of interest rate required and the 
actual interest rate can lead to costs in terms of higher volatility in inflation (higher inflation 
for countries in need of higher interest rate, and lower inflation for countries in need of lower 
interest rate), higher volatility in output gap (same logic as for inflation) and an unfavorable 
high level of unemployment in countries where the target rate should have been lower.  
4.3.3 The common currency’s effect on output  
An effect from the loss of the national monetary policy is the ability to use the interest rate to 
stimulate output. The MAD analysis and t-tests used to analyze volatility in inflation will be 
applied to output gap in this section. The mean absolute deviation from “normal” output, 
when the output gap is zero, is calculated in appendix D for the whole period; 1994-2011 
(OECD, 2011) and is divided into before and after the introduction of the euro in the 
respective countries. This analysis is based on yearly data for 14 Eurozone members gathered 
from OECD; data for Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia are not available. The MAD from normal 
output is calculated using the formula;  
Equation 4.9  
∑         
 
   
 
 
Due to the fact that the time series are available from 1994, gives a more correct estimate for 
the volatility in output before the euro compared to the volatility in inflation, on the other 
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hand, due to the small sample size from the time series being yearly, results must be 
interpreted with caution.  
When analyzing the whole period, the average deviation from normal output for the Eurozone 
is 1,34% (appendix D). The introduction of euro has stabilized output in Slovakia and Estonia, 
even though these are the countries that desire the highest interest rates when only considering 
inflation and output. The effects of the introduction of the euro to these countries can be 
further discussed to be uncertain due to their new membership status. When taking a t-test for 
the paired sample mean, I failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between before 
and after the euro (appendix C (b)).  
It is more reasonable to analyze the effects in output gap from the membership in the 
Eurozone when excluding the financial crisis in 2008. This is due to an abnormal increase in 
output before the crisis and an abnormal decline during the crisis. To analyze the effects 
before and after the euro, the years 1994-2006 are used. Estonia and Slovakia joined the 
Eurozone after 2006 and are therefore excluded from the table; this is due to the fact that the 
results are most likely to be biased due to the effects from the financial crisis.  
Table 7 presents the mean absolute deviation from “normal” output; 
Mean absolute deviation from "normal" output  
Period / Country 1994-2006 Before euro After euro Difference 
Eurozone 0,83 0,93 0,77 -0,15 
Austria 1,16 1,00 1,26 0,26 
Belgium 0,74 0,96 0,61 -0,36 
Finland 1,81 3,06 1,04 -2,02 
France 0,77 0,80 0,76 -0,04 
Germany 1,06 0,71 1,29 0,58 
Greece 1,22 1,27 1,15 -0,12 
Ireland 3,57 2,20 4,43 2,23 
Italy 1,10 1,37 0,94 -0,43 
Luxembourg 2,15 3,09 1,56 -1,53 
Netherlands 1,31 0,90 1,57 0,67 
Portugal 1,47 1,55 1,43 -0,12 
Spain 1,56 1,56 1,55 -0,01 
Table 7: Output gap and mean absolute deviation from normal output 
 
When looking at the period 1994-2006, the average deviation from trend in the Eurozone as a 
whole is 0,83% when the financial crisis is excluded, compared to a deviation of  1,34% when 
the financial crisis was included. If the time series had been longer, the financial crisis would 
have been more relevant, but due to the small sample size, and the fact of no severe expansion 
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or recession in the years 1994-1998 in Europe, the best way to analyze the impact of the euro 
to the output is to exclude the financial crisis, due to its large negative impact.  
Countries with largest deviation from trend during the whole period in the sample are Ireland, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. France, Belgium and Germany are the countries 
with the lowest degree of deviation from trend. Ireland and Spain had positive output gap in 
the mid-2000s when the other countries had negative output gaps. The economic activity in 
Ireland can be characterized as very strong in the years 1995-2007 (growth in relation to 
output gaps will be analyzed in the next section). Germany had the largest negative deviation 
between GDP and trend under the low economic activity period in the mid-2000s (OECD, 
2011), and can be a possible explanation for the low target rate level. 
The difference between deviation from trend before and after the introduction of the euro has 
been positive for some countries, positive in the meaning of output being closer to trend and 
lower volatility in output; Finland and Luxembourg are such countries. They tend to have had 
benefits of more stable output from being members of the Eurozone.  
For some countries, the introduction of the euro has showed no effect in terms of deviation 
from normal output in France, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Even though they have lost the 
most effective instrument to stimulate short term output and financial stability, they have not 
been suffering in terms of more volatile output.  
The countries with more volatile output after joining the Eurozone are Ireland, Germany and 
Netherlands. The extent of the effects in Germany and Netherlands can be discussed to be 
negative or insignificant, other factors than the introduction of the euro can be more 
explanatory in the matter of these countries. When it comes to Ireland, the deviation from 
trend before 1999 was 2,20% compared to 4,43% after 1999. This high level of output can be 
due to a too low interest rate level for too long. Furthermore, bubbles arose in prices and 
output, and when the financial crisis hit, the bubble busted and a banking crisis hit the Irish 
economy. Ireland has costs in terms of volatility in output associated with the loss of national 
monetary policy, in addition to inflation as seen in table 6. This result can be interpreted as the 
fact that Ireland needs its national monetary policy to stimulate the economy and the loss of 
national monetary policy is very costly. Monetary policy in Ireland does have an effect on 
price and financial stability. The European Central Bank has to consider the Eurozone as a 
whole when deciding upon monetary policy, Ireland need to use other instruments to 
stimulate price and financial stability.  
64 
 
It can be interesting to do a paired sample t-test to find out if the introduction of the euro had 
a significant positive or negative effect on volatility in output, 1994-1998 being the “before 
euro” and 1999-2006 being the “after euro”. The null hypothesis, H0, and the alternative 
hypothesis, H1, can be formulated as follows,   ̅̅̅̅  is the average deviation from normal output;  
Equation 4.10 H0:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro =   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
Equation 4.11 H1:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro ≠   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
From the paired sample t-test I fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level 
and there is no difference in deviation from “normal” output before and after the introduction 
of the euro. Due to the small sample size, a 10% significance level is appropriate, (p-value = 
0,7803) (appendix C (c)).  
The result, of no significant difference in deviation from “normal” output before and after the 
introduction of euro in the respective countries, must be interpreted with caution. The result of 
this analysis can only lead to the conclusion that there is no difference in the size of the output 
gap for the Eurozone as a whole, but it does not say anything about the situation for the 
individual countries.  
The development in output gap for some selected countries;  
 
Figure 18: Output gaps for selected countries 
-15,00%
-10,00%
-5,00%
0,00%
5,00%
10,00%
Output gaps for Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland 
Portugal Greece Spain Ireland Eurozone
65 
 
The reason why I have chosen to look at these four countries; Portugal, Greece, Spain and 
Ireland, is due to the development in output gap differs from the trends in the other countries, 
(with exception of the new Eurozone countries which had their own monetary policy in the 
beginning and the mid-2000s and become irrelevant in this context). The output gap is being 
used to measure economic activity, and when the output gap is negative the country 
experience a low economic activity period and when it is positive, the country experience a 
high economic activity period.  
The country which stands out the most is Ireland, which is also the country with the highest 
absolute deviation from trend. Ireland had a substantial expansion from 1996 until 2007. The 
membership in the Eurozone seems to have kept the activity in Ireland at a high level, until 
Ireland was the country with the fastest and largest decline in 2007-2008. The economic 
activity in Ireland is still below trend, but has recovered from 2010 to 2011.  
When looking at Spain and Portugal, their output gaps tend to be similar, with the exception 
of the fact that Spain did not experience the negative output gap in the mid-2000s, as almost 
every other member of the Eurozone did. They both have declined further from 2010 to 2011, 
which can be interpreted as them being in a recession.  
In Greece’s case, the output gap was negative for the first 10 years in the figure above. What 
separates Greece’s economic activity compared to other countries is the massive decline in 
output under and after the financial crisis in 2008. For the other countries, the output gap 
somewhat stabilized in 2009-2011, but Greece’s dropped, leading it into a deep recession.  
4.3.4 The common currency’s effect on growth in real GDP 
The problem when fast-growing countries form a monetary union with slow-growing 
countries is the risk of trade imbalances if the income elasticity between these countries is 
equal to one and the import tend to grow faster than export. To keep up competitiveness, the 
fast-growing countries would have to decrease prices, which would make the monetary union 
costly for fast-growing countries. Fast-growing countries are often the ones with more new 
products or old products with new features, which lead to the fact that income elasticity for 
export is higher and there are no trade imbalances (Krugman, 1989). De Grauwe (2009) 
concluded that the growth rates of fast-growing countries are sustainable after joining a 
monetary union.  
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I have presented the growth in real GDP for some countries, before and after the introduction 
of euro, that can be characterized as fast-growers before joining the monetary union;  
 
Figure 19: Growth in real GDP, before and after euro, for fast growing countries 
 
The fast-growing countries included in figure 19 are countries with average yearly growth in 
real GDP over 3% before becoming a member of the Eurozone (appendix E). The null 
hypothesis is that growth is sustainable; average growth in real GDP (  ̅̅̅̅ ) before joining a 
monetary union will be equal to average growth in real GDP after joining the union for fast-
growing countries;  
Equation 4.12 H0:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro =   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
Equation 4.13 H1:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro ≠   ̅̅̅̅ after euro 
When conducting a paired sample t-test for fast growing countries, the result is to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 1% significance level (p-value = 0,0024, appendix C (d)). The growth in 
real GDP significantly declined when joining the monetary union for fast growing countries. 
Due to a small sample size, the validity of the results can be questioned, even though the p-
value is very small, and the results can seem strong. The results can also be affected by the 
financial crisis in 2008, which led to negative growth for all member countries, and slow 
growth in the aftermath of the crisis.  
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It can also be interesting to look at the effects in GDP growth when joining a monetary union 
when the negative effects from the financial crisis are eliminated.  Table 20 illustrates average 
yearly growth in real GDP before, after and after the introduction of the euro until 2006. 
Slovakia and Cyprus are not relevant in this analysis due to their membership in the union 
becoming a reality after the test period.  
 
Figure 20: Growth in real GDP, before and after euro (until 2006) for fast-growing countries 
 
When looking at the graphical results in figure 20, the growth in real GDP seems to have 
increased after joining the monetary union for Greece and Luxembourg, when not including 
the financial crisis. For Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal, the growth has been 
reduced. The new hypotheses for testing if the monetary union has a significant effect on 
growth can be stated as follows;  
Equation 4.14 H0:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro =   ̅̅̅̅ after euro-2006 
Equation 4.15 H1:   ̅̅̅̅ before euro ≠   ̅̅̅̅ after euro-2006 
The result from the t-test after eliminating the effects from the financial crisis is that I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level (p-value = 0,1420, appendix C (e)), 
and the introduction of the euro and the membership in the monetary union does not have a 
significant effect in growth for fast-growing countries. This is in line with the conclusion of 
De Grauwe (2009), of sustainable growth in a monetary union. Only when including the 
financial crisis, the growth in real GDP significantly declines, which gives an indication of the 
impact of the crisis in many countries’ production.  
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The ECB forecasted the average annual growth in real GDP to be 2%, (section 2.4 a). Table 8 
presents the average yearly growth in real GDP for all Eurozone members from 1999-2011. 
Eurozone Belgium Germany Estonia Ireland  Greece   
1,54%  1,78%  1,36%  4,22%  3,44%  1,67%  
 
Spain  France  Italy  Cyprus Luxembourg Austria 
2,42%  1,53%  0,74%  2,95%  3,55%  1,82%  
 
Netherlands  Malta  Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Finland 
2,01%  1,60%  1,00%  2,85%  4,10%  2,35% 
Table 8: Average growth in real GDP (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
The growth in real GDP for the Eurozone as a whole has been moderate, and 1,54% in 
average, which is somewhat relatively lower than predicted.  
Fast-growing countries, the countries with highest average growth have been Estonia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia with an annual average growth of over 3%. Slovenia and Cyprus 
also tend to have had strong growth (close to 3%). Despite the fact that the financial crisis 
made a relatively huge cut in real GDP for Ireland, Estonia and Slovenia, they are still 
characterized as fast-growers. When looking at table 6 and the average absolute deviation 
from inflation target, all these 6 countries were among those with highest deviation from 
inflation target over the whole period 1997-2011, fast growing countries can be characterized 
by high volatility in inflation. The effect of the monetary union has been positive for Estonia, 
Slovenia and Slovakia in terms of less volatile inflation. For Ireland, the membership in the 
monetary union tends to have led to more volatile inflation. In terms of volatility in output, 
presented in table 7, the fast-growing countries; Luxembourg and Ireland, have the highest 
deviation from “normal” output in average over the whole period, and when looking at effects 
of the monetary union, the introduction of the euro have had strong effects on both; to 
Luxembourg in terms of less volatility, and to Ireland in terms of higher volatility.  
When moderate growth is defined as close to 2% (2±0,5), moderate growing countries in 
terms of average growth in real GDP from 1999-2011, in the Eurozone have been; Belgium, 
Greece, France, Austria, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, and Finland. All these countries have had 
an average deviation from inflation target close to 1%, over the whole period, and the effect 
of the introduction of the euro was insignificant to volatility in inflation (except for Spain). 
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When it comes to deviation from normal output, the moderate-growing countries are divided; 
Spain, Finland, Netherlands and Greece have had moderate to high deviation from normal 
output over the whole period, and the others have relatively low deviation from trend. The 
introduction of euro has not had any substantial effect to volatility in output, with the 
exception of Finland which has gained from the monetary union in terms of more stable 
output.  
Germany, Italy and Portugal can be characterized as slow-growing countries. Portugal used to 
have more growth, but after the introduction of the euro, and especially after the financial 
crisis, the average growth in Portugal has been low. Portugal has had more volatility in 
inflation compared to the other slow-growing countries, and the effect of the euro has been 
more negative, in terms of more volatile inflation. The average deviation from output has 
been higher for Portugal, and the introduction of the euro has not had a significant effect to 
the deviation from normal output. Portugal is more similar to the moderate-growing countries, 
due to these characteristics, compared to the slow-growing countries; Germany and Italy. 
Germany and Italy have low deviation from inflation target during the period, and the 
introduction of euro had no effect to the extent of the deviation. Output deviation is moderate, 
and the euro has led to increased deviation from trend for these two countries.  
Some concluding remarks from this analysis is that the fast-growing countries are 
characterized as volatile when it comes to inflation and output, in terms of absolute average 
deviation from target/normal. These are also the countries where the introduction of euro has 
had most effect. The moderate-growing countries have moderate volatility in inflation and 
output, and the introduction of the euro has had no significant effect. The slow-growing 
countries are characterized by low volatility in inflation, but somewhat higher volatility in 
output. The introduction of the euro has led to negative effects in output in terms of higher 
volatility in output, the output tend to deviate more from trend after 1999. The fact that the 
introduction of the euro has led to more deviation from inflation target/normal output for fast-
growing and slow-growing countries can be explained by the centralization of the monetary 
policy; the economic activity in fast-growing countries, which should have had higher interest 
rates, was fueled by the low level of interest rates. Slow-growing countries are less affected 
by the target rate level.  
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4.3.5 The common currency’s effect on unemployment  
It can also be interesting to locate effects of the introduction of the monetary union in 
unemployment. Table 9 presents the average yearly unemployment rate over the period 1995-
2011 (Eurostat, 2012), for all Eurozone members. The period is divided into “before” and 
“after” euro, and is given by the average unemployment rate over these periods.  
Period/Country Average 1995 - 2011 Before euro After euro Differance 
Eurozone 9,3 10,7 8,9 -1,7 
Belgium 8,1 9,4 7,8 -1,7 
Germany  8,7 9,1 8,6 -0,5 
Estonia 10,3 10,1 12,5 2,4 
Ireland 7,6 10,4 6,7 -3,7 
Greece 10,7 11,3 10,5 -0,7 
Spain 14,1 18,2 12,8 -5,4 
France 9,5 10,8 9,1 -1,8 
Italy 8,9 11,2 8,2 -3,0 
Cyprus 4,8 4,3 5,8 1,4 
Luxembourg 3,6 2,8 3,9 1,1 
Malta 7,0 7,2 6,6 -0,6 
Netherlands 4,3 5,8 3,9 -1,9 
Austria 4,3 4,3 4,3 0,0 
Portugal 7,7 6,7 8,0 1,4 
Slovenia 6,5 6,7 6,1 -0,5 
Slovakia 15,1 15,6 13,3 -2,3 
Finland 9,6 13,5 8,4 -5,1 
Table 9: Unemployment  
 
The average unemployment for the Eurozone as a whole is 9,3%, and is relatively high. This 
high unemployment rate can be caused by structural issues and legislation. The countries 
contributing most to this high unemployment are the highest weighted countries in the 
Eurozone aggregate; Germany, France and Italy. Spain also contributes to the high 
unemployment by its average of 14,1%.   
It looks like most countries have decreased unemployment rates after joining the monetary 
union, with exceptions of Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal. The decrease in 
unemployment can be tested whether or not it is significant.  
Equation 4.16 H0:  ̅before euro =  ̅after euro 
Equation 4.17 H1:  ̅before euro ≠  ̅after euro 
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When taking a paired sample t-test for the average unemployment rate for these two periods, 
the result is to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significant level (p-value = 0,0245, 
appendix C (f)), and conclude that the membership in the European Monetary Union has led 
to an overall decrease in unemployment for the members. Again, the result must be 
interpreted with caution. The financial crisis is included in this period, and even though the 
financial crisis led to relatively large increase in unemployment, the effect of the monetary 
union is still positive.  
Looking at the development in unemployment rates (appendix F), not all countries have 
suffered in terms of increased unemployment under the financial crisis. The unemployment 
rates for the different countries which did not increase under or after the financial crisis can be 
grouped into degree of relative size and relative stability:  
- Low and stable (under 5%): Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Austria 
- Moderate and stable (7-9%): Belgium, Malta and Slovenia 
- High and stable (close to 10%): France 
- Decreasing from high to relatively low: Italy, Finland, Germany and Slovakia 
- High and very volatile: Estonia 
The other countries are more volatile as seen graphically in figure 20, and these are also the 
countries where the financial crisis has affected unemployment negatively.  
Development in unemployment for Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal;  
 
Figure 21: Unemployment 
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The unemployment rates for Spain, Ireland and Portugal were decreasing before they joined 
the monetary union, and the financial crisis triggered ripple effects which affected the 
unemployment rates in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal negatively to great extent.  
For Spain, the unemployment rate continued to decrease also after joining the monetary 
union. The overall high level of unemployment is due to structural issues in employment 
laws, reluctance to give full employment, few fixed jobs with full employment security, due 
to the gap between firing costs of workers with permanent and temporary contracts, and larger 
degree of regulation on use of temporary contracts (Bentolila et al., 2011). After the financial 
crisis, the unemployment rate has increased to over 20%.  
In Ireland, the unemployment rate fell towards the introduction of the euro, and after the 
membership in the monetary union was a fact, the unemployment rate stayed relatively fixed 
at a low level until 2007. The relatively low interest rate level in the Eurozone could have 
been a driver for the low, maybe unsustainable, unemployment rate in Ireland, in addition to a 
high growth level in real GDP and a throughout positive output gap.  
The membership in the monetary union seems to have had a negative effect to Portugal in 
terms of an increasing unemployment rate after the introduction of euro. Portugal experienced 
a loss of competitiveness after joining the monetary union.  
Greece had positive development in unemployment after becoming a member of the 
Eurozone, the unemployment rate declined until 2008. The effects in unemployment rate from 
the financial crisis have dampened in the other countries, but the unemployment rate in 
Greece is increasing. Main problems for Greece are high debt levels, a tight budgetary 
situation, and a currency that is too expensive.  
Spain and Ireland has suffered most in terms of increased unemployment after the financial 
crisis, these countries are characterized by more competitive labor markets (Acocella et al., 
2010). Countries with higher degree of labor market imperfections have suffered less in terms 
of increased unemployment; Italy, France and Germany are such countries. The main result 
found by Acocella et al. (2010) is that in the case of a labor wedge, real wages are increased. 
This result can be explained by an example in the case of a negative financial shock; if the 
labor wedge is low, firms will substitute capital with labor, and a high labor wedge will lower 
the volatility in economy.  
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4.4 The budgetary situation for all Eurozone members 
The reason for the recent discussions about the high debt levels in some Eurozone countries, 
and the negative associations, is the risk involved with high debt levels. An increased risk of 
default in one country implies a risk to the whole Eurozone in terms of higher interest rates on 
debt and costs in relation to a potential bailout. The government debt level and the budget 
deficits for all Eurozone members in 2011 are illustrated in figure 22; 
 
Figure 22: Debt and budget deficit for all Eurozone members in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
In 2011, only Estonia, Luxembourg and Finland fulfilled the Maastricht criteria of budget 
deficit less than 3% of GDP and a government debt level of less than 60% of GDP. The 
budget deficit rule was met by Malta, Austria and Germany, and the government debt rule 
was met by Slovenia and Slovakia. The total debt in the Eurozone was 87% of total GDP and 
the budget deficit 4% of total Eurozone GDP. Countries with the highest debt levels were 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal with a government debt level over 100%, and the countries 
with the highest budget deficits were Ireland, Greece and Spain. The 2011 situation may not 
be representative, in terms of relatively unusual high budget deficits due to the recent crisis. It 
can be interesting to look at the average debt and deficit levels over the recent years, and from 
this see how the individual countries have performed in relation to the criteria of Maastricht 
and the rules of the Stability and Growth pact.  
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The average level of government debt and budget deficits for the period 1999-2011 for the 
Eurozone member countries are stated in table 10.   
Average level of government debt and budget deficit in percent of GDP, 1999-2011 
Country Eurozone Belgium Germany Estonia Ireland Greece 
Government debt 72,5 97,5 67,6 5,4 46,1 112,7 
Budget deficit  -2,8 -1,4 -2,2 0,2 -3,9 -7,1 
              
Country Spain France Italy Cyprus Luxembourg Malta 
Government debt 51,4 66,9 109,0 63,0 9,5 64,5 
Budget deficit  -2,4 -3,6 -3,3 -3,1 1,8 -4,8 
              
Country Netherlands Austria Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Finland 
Government debt 54,8 66,2 66,7 29,2 39,7 42,6 
Budget deficit  -1,5 -2,2 -5,0 -3,2 -5,4 2,5 
Table 10: Average government debt and budget deficit levels for all Eurozone countries (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
In average over the period 1999-2011, Estonia, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland 
have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria of budget deficit less than 3% of GDP and a government 
debt level of less than 60% of GDP. The budget deficit rule has in average been met by the 
Eurozone aggregate, Belgium, Germany and Austria, and the government debt rule has in 
average been met by Ireland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The average debt in the Eurozone has 
been 72% of total GDP and the budget deficit 3% of Eurozone GDP, which means that in 
average, the Eurozone as a whole has performed well when it comes to budget deficit, but not 
government debt in relation to the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
countries with overall high debt levels are Greece and Italy, with a government debt level 
over 100% of GDP, and the countries with overall high budget deficits are Greece, Portugal 
and Slovenia.  
When comparing the budget situation for 2011 with the average budget situation, the financial 
crisis had a deep impact on Spain and Ireland, which have relatively good budget situations in 
average over the period. It should be mentioned that the comparison between 2011 and the 
average budget situation does not reveal growth in budget deficit and government debt, and 
the financial crisis cannot take the whole blame for the deteriorated budget situation in 2011.  
Even though the debt levels and the budget deficits are high in some countries, one cannot 
draw any conclusions about the condition of the debts and deficits from the figures above. To 
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evaluate the condition of the Eurozone budgets, some factors next to debt and deficit are 
relevant, such as growth level and the real interest rate on the government debt. Theory of 
debt dynamics was presented in part 2.5.2, and when knowing the budget deficit, growth in 
GDP and the real interest rate on debt, the 10 year bond yield
6
 (Eurostat, 2012), the Eurozone 
countries can be placed in figure 6. The calculations are shown in appendix G, in addition to 
the debt dynamics for the Eurozone countries in 2010.  
 
Figure 23: Debt dynamics in the Eurozone 
 
All Eurozone countries have budget deficits in 2011, the countries above the line are debt 
borrowers in equilibrium, and can be characterized as having a stable equilibrium, and the 
countries under the line are debt creditors in equilibrium, which makes the debt dynamics 
unstable. The reason for the Eurozone as a whole being under the stability line is the low 
growth in GDP in 2011.   
                                      
6 Maastricht criterion bond yields: definition used for the convergence criterion for EMU for long-term interest rates (central 
government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with around 10 years' residual maturity). Source: Eurostat.  
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The fundamental reason for the debt crisis is the long term unsustainable increase in debt in 
private sector (De Grauwe, 2010). The increase in debt levels were driven by animal spirits; 
optimism due to decline in real interest rates, in Spain and Ireland, and pessimism in 
Germany. Animal spirits are self-fulfilling, and can lead to bubbles and booms/reverse.  
The countries where the debt levels were unstable in 2011 were Greece, Spain, Cyprus, 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Slovenia. These countries have high budget deficits, an interest 
rate on debt that exceeds growth in the respective country, or both. Consequences of a high 
debt level can be illustrated by the situation of Greece; the country with the highest debt level 
in 2011. When Greece joined the Eurozone, the rules and ratings for the Eurozone applied. 
Greece automatically got better rated in terms of credit worthiness, and as a result, the interest 
rate on long term debt decreased. When the debt got cheaper, Greece lent more and spent it, 
taxes stayed the same. The debt level and budget deficit skyrocketed, and Greece suddenly 
became a more risky investment. Credit ratings fell and interest rate on long term debt 
increased. The debt Greece had managed to obtain in the short period of time was 
unsustainable and the risk of default increased; Greece became in risk of bankruptcy.  
Many of the Eurozone member countries have not managed the fiscal situation well. Many 
countries exceed the 60% debt limit and the 3% budget deficit limit stated in the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Reasons for the high budget deficits and debt levels 
may be due to political reasons. As the price of debt fell, and at the same time it became easier 
to borrow, the governments in some countries were tempted to increase their debt levels to 
increase spending. When the financial crisis hit, and as debt increased, creditworthiness was 
lowered, the investors raised the risk premium reflected in increased long term yields. The 
debt became difficult to manage, and the risk of default increased. Countries lined up to be 
saved by the EU and IMF from their unmanageable high interest rates on debt. In some 
countries, it can be close to impossible to lower the debt level once it is high due to the 
political opposition’s promise of better conditions if they are elected, and so the debt trap 
continues.  
When becoming a member of the European Monetary Union, a country loses the ability to 
conduct national monetary policy, and the remaining instrument is the fiscal policy. How can 
the member countries stimulate financial stability when there are restrictions on the use of 
fiscal policy in terms of 60% debt of GDP limit, and 3% of GDP limit for budget deficits? 
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5. Results 
This part will follow the same structure as the analysis; it will start by summing up the results 
from the evaluation of the management of the monetary policy in the Eurozone, followed by a 
presentation of the results from the analysis related to whether or not the Eurozone form an 
optimal currency area, and is completed by presenting the results from the net effects that 
member countries have had from joining the monetary union in Europe.  
 
5.1 The monetary policy in the Eurozone 
The ECB has managed the monetary policy with success, when success only implies keeping 
inflation close to target. The Eurozone has had stable and relatively low inflation, but higher 
than the target (inflation below 2%). The output has been stable and not deviated much from 
trend, the interest rate has to some extent been used to correct for deviating output. When it 
comes to the fiscal situation of the Eurozone as a whole, the budget deficit has been below 3% 
(until the financial crisis), but the government debt has never been below 60%.  
When it comes to price stability versus financial stability, ECB chose to have price stability as 
main target for the Eurozone’s monetary policy; because it was believed that price stability 
led to financial stability. The financial crisis in 2008 proved that price stability does not 
necessarily imply financial stability, and without focus on financial stability next to price 
stability, the risk of an economic collapse increases. It was argued that financial stability can 
be difficult to monitor, but as mentioned in part 2.4.1, financial instabilities can easily be 
measured by monitoring asset prices and credit growth.  
Have the emphasis of price stability to financial stability changed after the financial crisis? 
The president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, stated that “We are resolutely 
determined to guarantee the financial stability of the Eurozone” (EU Business, 2011), and the 
president of ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, stated that “We remain firmly attached to the goal of 
price stability” (Harrington, 2010). The debate on financial stability as a target for the 
monetary policy in the Eurozone has been brought back to light after the financial crisis (Agur 
and Demertzis, 2011). Financial stability as a target is supported by empirical research with 
the result that the policy rate affects risk taking. Opponents states that the bank regulator 
should take care of the bank risk.  
78 
 
As the situation is today, the national central bank is responsible for maintaining financial 
stability, and to monitor banks in its own country. The result of the delegated responsibility of 
financial stability has been lacking supervision of banks; they have expanded their balance 
sheets and taken excessive risk. The behavior of the banks can be explained by the fact that 
central banks and governments provide funding in the case of a crisis, and the banks keep 
investing in risky assets with the risk being held by the authorities. This development in the 
behavior of banks creates major risks and can provoke a future banking crisis. There is a great 
need for a centralization of the responsibility of maintaining financial stability and monitor 
banks.  
 
5.2 Sum of main results from the analysis 
The new member countries have the highest levels of trade, open countries contribute more to 
the Eurozone and they also gain more from their memberships. Shocks in real GDP, 
employment and real demand are relatively symmetric between the member countries and the 
Eurozone as a whole. The unemployment in the member countries has significantly declined 
after becoming a member of the monetary union.  
Growth appears to be sustainable. Fast-growing countries have the highest volatility in 
inflation and output, in terms of absolute average deviation from target/normal, and losing 
their national monetary policy seems to have led to increased deviation from the 2% target. 
The moderate-growing countries have moderate volatility in inflation and output, and the 
introduction of the euro had no significant effect. Slow-growing countries have low volatility 
in inflation, but somewhat higher volatility in output and seem to be less effected by the target 
rate level, but the introduction of the euro has led to negative effects in output in terms of 
higher volatility in output, the outputs tend to deviate more from trend after 1999.  
Almost every member country tends to violate at least one of the Maastricht criteria of 
government debt and budget deficit of 60% and 3% of GDP, respectively.  
Even though the desired interest rates between member countries deviate by close to 10% in 
2011, it does not seem to attract consequences in form of increased volatility in inflation and 
output gap. The cost of countries losing their national monetary policy does not seem to be 
severe for the Eurozone members, and most countries have net gains from their memberships. 
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5.3 The Eurozone in relation to theory of optimal currency areas 
On the basis of openness, symmetry in shocks and the budgetary situation, I made a scorecard 
where I gave each country a score on their performance related to these three factors 
(appendix H (a)). The countries that contributes to net benefits in the Eurozone, and further 
converges it towards being an optimal currency area; generates trade benefits, have a high 
degree in symmetry of shocks and do not cause excessive risk in relation to the budget 
situation.  
Countries with net contribution (a positive score) are green in figure 24 and countries who got 
a negative score are red. There are two shades of green, the darkest being the countries that 
contributes the most.  
 
 
Figure 24: Countries that do/do not contribute to make the Eurozone an optimal currency area 
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The main result when the scores are given is that Greece is the only country that tends to be 
costly for the monetary union. Greece is relatively closed when it comes to trade, mostly due 
to the lack of natural resources to export, and low degree of import. Shocks have been 
symmetric to some extent, but not as much as for the other countries. The budgetary situation 
is the most important factor when it comes to Greece being a net cost for the Eurozone; the 
high level of government debt creates a risk, not only for Greece, but also for the Eurozone as 
a whole. If Greece defaults on paying its debt, the Eurozone has some responsibility for the 
debt. The risk of default, the high risk premium claimed by investors and the high long term 
bond yields can cause a risk of the Eurozone has to pay Greece’s debt, with high interest rates.  
If Greece secedes or is forced to leave the Eurozone, a critical consequence can be that Greece 
would not be able to borrow money due to its reputation of excessive risk of default and high 
debt level. To be able to manage its debt and budget deficits, Greece is most likely to print 
money, which may cause a risk of inflation problems, and even hyperinflation.  
The Eurozone definitely has the ability to become an optimal currency area, with or without 
Greece. It is very difficult to determine if the Eurozone as it is today forms an optimal 
currency area, many factors suggest “yes” (symmetry in shocks and trade benefits), but many 
factors also suggest “no” (low flexibility in labor markets and as long as Greece is a member). 
If the Eurozone does not form an optimal currency area today, the Eurozone has potential to 
become an optimal currency area with the right measures and with time.  
 
Concerning the question if the Eurozone is an optimal currency area;  
- “The Eurozone has been a very successful currency area” (Feldstein, 2008) 
- “The benefits exceed the costs. There is greater resilience of the euro area as a whole, 
low actual and expected inflation, low interest rates and greater macroeconomic 
stability. A benefit that has not yet emerged is the enhanced cross-country competition 
in several services” (Mongelli, 2008) 
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5.4 Net effects for individual countries by introducing euro 
On the basis of openness, consequences from the introduction of euro in relation to inflation, 
output and unemployment, and the budgetary situation, I made a scorecard where each 
country was scored by how they were been affected in relation to these five factors (appendix 
H (b)). Countries that have gained from becoming a member of EMU have; trade benefits, 
lower volatility in inflation and output, lower unemployment and a good budget situation.  
Countries that have net benefits (a positive score) are green in figure 25, countries that got a 
negative score are red, and countries with a score of zero are yellow. There are two shades of 
green, the darkest being the countries that have gained the most from a common currency.  
 
Figure 25: The net effect of the introduction of the euro to individual countries 
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The countries that are yellow on the map; Portugal and Greece, have both benefits and costs 
by being in a monetary union, and the costs cancel out the benefits. Ireland is the only country 
with clear net costs by being a part of the Eurozone. The loss of monetary policy has been 
severe, the economy in Ireland differs from the rest of the Eurozone, and Ireland does not 
seem to have effective instruments to stimulate financial, real economic and fiscal stability.  
An optimal currency area is characterized as an area which increases wealth for its members, 
this can be wealth in terms of profit, many profit from no transaction costs when trading with 
other countries, it can be in terms of more stable financial and economic markets. For 
consumers it can be price transparency, housing prices
7
 etc.  
Ireland experienced financial instability, a banking crisis, instabilities in prices, output, fiscal 
situation, an unsustainable low unemployment rate and a major bubble in house prices prior to 
the financial crisis, as a result of a too expansive monetary policy. The house price bubble 
busted and the real house prices fell dramatically, which led to great losses for consumers.  
 
Figure 26: Real house prices in Ireland (Eurostat, 2012) 
 
The monetary union has been a great cost for Ireland; for the government, businesses and for 
consumers, in terms of the losing the ability to conduct national monetary policy.  
                                      
7 The deflated house price index (or real house price index) is the ratio between the house price index (HPI) and the national 
accounts deflator for private final consumption expenditure (households and NPIs). This indicator therefore measures inflation 
in the house market relative to inflation in the final consumption expenditure of households and NPIs. Eurostat HPI captures 
price changes of all residential properties purchased by households (flats, detached houses, terraced houses, etc.), both new 
and existing, independently of their final use and their previous owners. Only market prices are considered, self-build dwellings 
are therefore excluded. The land component is included. Source: Eurostat.  
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6 Discussion 
What measures can be made to transform the EMU into what we can with certainty call an 
optimal currency area? This question will be discussed in this part of the thesis, after a short 
discussion of what happens in a Eurozone break-up and what happens if there are no major 
structural changes in Eurozone. 
The scenarios mentioned above were my initial thoughts of possible outcomes for the future 
of the Eurozone. The break-up and the no-change outcomes can be seen as extremities; break-
up as the most expensive in terms of money, and no-change as the most expensive in terms of 
burden of the citizens and prosperity. I believe that there must be a middle way with a future 
outcome that is better than these extremities, and with the right measures, reforms, structural 
changes and long-term perspective, the Eurozone will eventually become a well functional 
monetary (and political) union, which increases wealth for all its members.  
There is a strategy model which was initially made for companies, formed by Barbra Gibson, 
Adjunct Professor at Hult International Business School, which I find illustrative in my thesis, 
reflecting the outcomes above. Although the model was intended to describe various 
situations managers face when involved in a joint venture in different cultures, it explains 
possible outcomes of a strategy well. 
 
Figure 27: Strategy model (Gibson, 2012) 
 
The model explains that you will start out with a strategy, and the strategy can either lead to 
success or failure. If the strategy leads to success, the strategy is usually repeated until it fails 
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(it will eventually fail due to dynamic environment, cultural differences, new laws, change in 
preferences etc.). Unless you know the market and continuously improve and adapt (not 
repeat), the strategy is most likely to fail at some point, and when it does, there are in this 
illustration three possible directions when experiencing a failure. Abandon strategy; either 
make a new strategy or avoid progress. Continue; when you fail and just continue with the 
same strategy, you will continue to fail over and over. Adapt; you can adapt the strategy to the 
market, culture, laws, products etc. until you succeed, and then repeat the strategy until 
failure. These are the dynamics of this model.  
When applying this model to the Eurozone, the strategy was to create a monetary union with a 
common currency in the Eurozone, with a goal/vision of full integration in the European 
financial, banking, labor, capital and retail markets. The strategy was developed over many 
years, and was realized in 1999 theoretically (central bank), and in 2002 physically (the euro 
in coins and notes). It was a success. The strategy was repeated, and in 2008 it went wrong; it 
failed. The Eurozone members’ national central banks had lost their most powerful 
instruments to correct economic and financial disturbances, the interest rate and the exchange 
rate, and were forced to follow the common strategies which led them into to more and deeper 
problems. The failure is a fact, and discussions and theories are many about what comes next; 
are countries going to secede from the euro and go back to their former currencies? This can 
be related to the abandon and avoid boxes in the model. What happens if they do nothing? 
They continue the strategy that has already failed, and fall into deeper problems. Or are they 
going to adapt to make the Eurozone a more optimal currency area and reach for success once 
again?  
These different directions have been heavily discussed lately, and I will sum up these 
discussions in the following three paragraphs in my thesis. I am also going to sum up and 
discuss some measures on how to get back on track. This part is relatively brief and 
superficial, and is included in my thesis as an extension on what measures can be made to 
form an optimal currency area.   
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6.1 Scenario 1: A Eurozone break-up 
Milton Friedman predicted in 2002 a collapse of the euro within 10 years due to disintegration 
from linguistic and cultural differences (Frydrych, 2002). Now, in 2012, it is 10 years after his 
prediction, which has yet to come true, a break-up of the euro is a hot topic.  
The recent turmoil in the European markets has led to speculation in a break-up of the 
Eurozone. Some say it is too costly to fix the problems by structural changes, and some say 
the Eurozone is better off with their old currencies. If the members of the Eurozone choose to 
leave the euro and reinforce their national currencies, countries in need for a more 
expansionary monetary policy can devalue their national currencies and lower the national 
interest rates. These measures will lead to increased demand for national goods, investment, 
consumption and a better position when it comes to competitiveness. Furthermore, these 
effects will again lead to more employment and price and wage pressures. With the national 
monetary policy regained, countries decides their own monetary targets, which may be better 
suited for the economic and financial situation of the country, and debt will be priced 
correctly (when the euro was introduced, they could borrow at the same rate as the Eurozone).  
If one country secedes, will the others follow? Germany and France will always stand up for 
the euro, and Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria will stand together with 
Germany and France (Klovland, 2012). Countries with large costs due to the loss of national 
monetary policy will probably follow the first seceding country.  
There may be a lot of benefits from seceding from the Eurozone for some countries, but there 
will also be costs, costs in terms of losing the benefits associated with the membership in the 
European Monetary Union, and costs directly linked to the actual break-out. Barry 
Eichengreen (2010) wrote about different costs associated with a country seceding from the 
Eurozone. He starts his article by the statement that the decision to join the Eurozone is 
“effectively irreversible”, before he lists up costs related to the potential break-out. First, there 
are economic costs such as the fact that wage inflation might neutralize potential benefits of 
increased competitiveness, and higher interests on public debt. To prevent the benefits by 
seceding to be cancelled out by the mentioned potential reactions, a labor market reform and a 
fiscal institution reform is needed when introducing the old currency. Second, there can be 
political costs associated with antagonizing the union/trading partners, and the stamp as a 
second class member of the EU. Third, there are major procedural and planning costs related 
to the reintroduction of the national currency such as the fact that all contracts need to be 
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renegotiated (wages, bank deposits, bonds, mortgages, taxes etc.). Computers will need 
reprogramming, vending and payment machines have to be renewed, labeling costs in stores 
etc. A devaluation of the national currency may lead to a system-wide bank run due to 
households and firms shifting deposits. Investors may escape, the fiscal situation may be 
exacerbated, the government would not be able to bail out banks; these factors may contribute 
to a bond-market crisis.  
 
6.2 Scenario 2: No major structural changes 
The scenario of no major structural changes relates to the “continue and fail” dynamic in 
figure 27. This can be argued to be the least favorable option due to the risk of triggering new 
crises and put all the Eurozone member countries in a risky position. It is not likely that 
countries with high debt and large budget deficits are able to solve their budget problems on 
their own, mostly due to political issues. If the reigning government cuts spending, increase 
tax, or increase the pension age, the opposition will take advantage of this and promise a more 
expansionary fiscal policy. With no major structural changes, more countries would need help 
from the ESM and IMF, and the economic and financial situation for the countries with 
budget problems and different preferences in monetary policy will worsen.  
Countries with high unemployment rate and low economic activity (like Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Ireland) should exert an expansionary fiscal policy by increasing spending and/or 
reduce taxes to encourage economic activity in the respective country, but they cannot do that 
due to the high debt levels, large budget deficits and the budget restrictions in the Stability 
and Growth Pact. ESM and IMF cannot bail them out indefinitely. To reduce debt problems, 
they have to tighten their budgets, which lead to education cuts and health cuts, or they can 
increase taxes, but if they do they will lose competitiveness and may be forced to cut back on 
employees. The results may be more unemployment, an economy in deep recession and 
poverty. Without major structural changes and without their national monetary policy, they 
are locked in a paradox.   
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6.3 Scenario 3: Measures and structural changes to improve EMU 
“Europe will emerge from its current turmoil, not only with the euro intact, but with far 
stronger institutions and economic prospects for the future” (Bergsten & Kirkegaard, 2012). 
“Without EU-IMF aid, Greece could not pay salaries and pensions or run day-to-day 
government operations, a combustible addition to an already unstable political environment” 
(Hope, 2012).This is a statement in relation to the Greek election in 2012, where only 2 of the 
6 political parties support financial aid from EU and IMF.  
The first statement gives hope to the future of the euro, and that the time for innovation is in 
times of crises. The other statement illustrates the need for major structural changes in the 
Eurozone design and its institutions.  
There are many possible solutions and suggestions of structural changes and measures to 
improve the economic and financial situation in the Eurozone such as a reform to ensure 
growth, encourage confidence in the financial markets, supervision and stress tests of banks; 
recapitalize if needed, a need to establish crisis resolution procedures, labor market reforms to 
adjust wages to gain competitiveness, and tightening and cuts in countries with budget 
problems.  
This part will start by presenting measures to improve the situation of the Eurozone suggested 
by the EU leaders in addition to targets for the future, followed by a presentation of hot topics 
and their content. Finally, structural changes and measures will be stated and consequences 
will be considered.  
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6.3.1 Measures and targets stated by EU-leaders 
 
The EU-summit meeting, 26 October 2011, resulted in 7 measures to solve the Eurozone 
crisis (European Council, 2011). The main features of these measures can be summed up as 
follows;  
 An agreement to secure a reduction of Greek debt to GDP ratio to 120% by 2020 
 Optimize resources of the EFSF and allow it to be leveraged 
 Raise confidence in the banking sector by facilitating access to term-funding and 
increase the capital position 
 Ensure fiscal discipline and accelerate structural reforms for growth and 
employment  
 Strengthening economic and fiscal coordination and surveillance 
 10 measures to improve the governance of the Eurozone 
 Give a mandate to the President of the European Council to identify steps to 
strengthen the economic union and explore possible (limited) Treaty changes.  
 
The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, have stated that the construction of the Eurozone 
must be changed, and that Treaty changes are an immediate part of solving the crisis, which is 
the political response to a political derived confidence crisis (BBC, 2011).  
 
The EU has decided upon 5 targets for the whole of EU within 2020;  
 Employment: 75% between 20-64 years to be employed 
 R&D: invest 3% of EU GDP 
 Climate/energy: lower greenhouse gas emissions, more energy from renewable 
resources and an increase in energy efficiency. 
 Education: reduce dropout rates and increase completion rate of 3rd level education 
 Poverty: 20 mill fewer people in risk of poverty 
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6.3.2 Hot topics 
A Eurozone ‘holiday’, Grexit, Eurobonds, austerity in relation to SGP and a growth pact are 
‘hot’ topics these days. This section will give a brief introduction to these topics.  
A Eurozone ‘holiday’ 
The financial and economic situations in Greece after the financial crisis have been turbulent, 
Greece is on the edge of bankruptcy and an exit from the euro has been heavily debated. An 
alternative proposal to prevent a future break-up of the Eurozone is to give Greece a “holiday” 
(Feldstein, 2010). The proposal opens up to let Greece leave the euro, and come back with a 
stronger competitive position. The main features are that the bank balances and obligations 
would remain in euros, and wages and prices to be set in drachma, the drachma would 
devaluate against the euro, leaving Greek products more competitive both home and abroad. 
Conditions to let Greece have a holiday would to be tough fiscal measures against the high 
level of budget deficit and for it to stay at a lower level. Feldstein concludes with “it is better 
than having the country permanently leave the Eurozone”. Cavallo and Cottani (2010) 
disagree upon giving Greece a holiday, and argue that “a better solution would be to adjust the 
Greek tax system”, also called a fiscal devaluation (mentioned in part 2.5.3). Empirical testing 
shows that income and corporate taxes are associated with lower economic growth than taxes 
on consumption and property (Arnold, 2008), and that property tax is most growth friendly.  
Grexit 
“If a member of a club does not respect the rules, it is better that it leaves the club” was the 
statement of the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso (The 
economist, 2012), when discussing Greece in relation to its political turmoil. The outcome of 
the Greek election is uncertain, and with only 2 of the 6 political parties supporting the EU-
IMF financial support, there is a risk that Greece will not abide the terms of its bail-out. The 
term “Grexit” has aroused due to the fact that a Greek exit becomes more realistic. It has been 
estimated a 50% probability that Greece will leave the euro.  
Eurobonds 
Eurobonds (not Eurobond) is shorthand for the Eurozone sovereign debts that is jointly 
guaranteed by the 17 member countries. Eurobonds is a suggested measure against the high 
yields on countries government debt, and is believed to make the yield sustainable and the 
risk of debt default lower. Gros (2012) argues that Eurobonds only make sense in a political 
union, and that a country with a moderate debt level might be driven to insolvency due to 
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pressure of an increased government debt as a result of the low yields. A suggested measure 
to this problem is to divide the debt into “blue” and “red”, e.g. debt up to 60% of GDP is 
guaranteed by the 17 members, and the single country has to manage the rest. Opponents of 
this dividing of debt argue that the yields on the red debt will explode due to lack of buyers. 
Austerity 
The matter of austerity in relation to budgets has also been discussed lately. The need for 
budget rules can both lead to more or less discipline. It can lead to less discipline because 
member states have an incentive of issuing unsustainable amount of debt due to the bailout 
guarantee; there is a moral hazard problem. It is also discussed that more rules lead to more 
discipline because countries that join the union cannot create money to finance budgets. It 
appears that the latter is the strongest, and the incentive not to run deficits is stronger (De 
Grauwe, 2009). A restraint on spending is most effective when it comes to reduce deficits and 
debt; cut social benefits and public wages. Also, a long-term real GDP increase has an effect 
of reducing debt (Nickel et al., 2010).  
Fiscal policy in some countries tends to be driven by the motivation of political gains, and not 
economic gains. The governments in these countries use fiscal policy to win elections, not to 
stabilize the economy. More regulation can result in better management of fiscal policy and 
make it an economical matter, and not political, if governments have the correct guidelines, 
they cannot use fiscal policy for political gains.  
A Eurozone growth pact 
Recently, it has been brought to light that budget cutting in times of recession can be 
damaging in terms of high unemployment and slow growth, due to falling demand as 
consumers are concerned about job security and disposable income. The need for a Eurozone 
growth pact is favorable to austerity (Atkins, 2012).  
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6.3.3 Measures and structural changes 
The central bank to regain control over financial stability 
Give the responsibility of financial stability back to the central bank. The central bank can 
monitor financial instability as mentioned in part 2.4.1. One measure to increase growth for 
the member countries in the Eurozone may be to keep the interest rate at a low level, and let 
each country tighten the fiscal policy in relation to the state of the economic situation in each 
country, and at the same time improve their budget situation. The individual countries would 
by this get a lot of trust, and not all countries can be trusted to follow this policy.  
The instruments of the government 
As mentioned a few times already, fiscal devaluation can be an effective measure for 
countries to regain competitiveness and promote economic growth.  
In the theory of debt dynamics, debt erosion was mentioned as an option to reduce the debts 
real value. Debt erosion only works for domestic creditors or debt in domestic currency, and 
since all Eurozone members have integrated credit markets and the same currency, debt 
erosion should be possible. There is one crucial obstacle; the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty 
includes an inflation criterion which do not allow members to have higher inflation than 1,5% 
more than the average of the three countries in EU with lowest inflation.  
Labor market flexibility and language 
By introducing a common language in the Eurozone, e.g. English, in the early stage of school, 
this may lead to higher degree of mobility of labor in the long run, when it comes to move to 
another country to work. This increase in labor mobility is an important adjustment 
mechanism in a monetary union, to adjust for asymmetric shocks so that these shocks will 
have less impact on wages, unemployment etc. As it is today, many countries do have English 
in school, but the quality varies a lot.  
A common identity 
A political community needs a common set of values and references to ensure its coherence, 
and to guide its actions and endow these with legitimacy and meaning. A consequence of 
citizens of the Eurozone identifying themselves only with their country of origin and not the 
Eurozone as a whole, they may be reluctant to move when the economic and financial 
situation worsens, and prevent the adjustment mechanisms when an asymmetric shock occur 
to function properly. When citizens from one country have to move to another, they may feel 
92 
 
like they are losing their identity; their culture, language and religion. An important task for 
the leaders of the European Monetary Union and also the European Union is to create a 
common identity, with a common set of values. Defining the EU's borders and boosting the 
political legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of its citizens is the 'glue' that unites all 
Europeans and keeps the bloc together (Euractiv, 2011).  
Laws and legislation 
A monetary union and the potential political union need the same set of laws and legislation. 
The differences between countries need to be reduced, and this can be done by introducing 
common laws and legislation when it comes to the labor market. The Eurozone, and the EU, 
should facilitate for more jobs in the public sector, these are less affected by financial and 
economic situations, and may lead to the feeling of being secure for the employees.  
A fiscal union with centralized budgets and Eurobonds 
Centralizing a significant part of national budgets at the union level can lead to multiple 
benefits such as an insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks, regulate the Eurozone 
debt level and budget deficit and facilitate for Eurobonds. Eurobonds will ease the budgetary 
pressure in many Eurozone countries, and may result in a solution of the debt crisis.  
Differences in taxation, spending, social security and wage policies, which are decided at 
national level, can lead to asymmetric shocks, e.g. one country can better its competitive 
position. To enhance the sustainability of a monetary union it is important to have a central 
budget. National wage policies will have to be coordinated to avoid asymmetric developments 
in competitive positions of the member countries.  
A political union; “The United States of Euro(pe)”  
For the monetary union to function properly in the long run, a political union is needed. The 
Eurozone may benefit from becoming a political union, whit a federal state, a president, the 
same laws and legislations. This measure comes with a lot of implementation problems and a 
relatively long time-perspective.  
The political union should be designed to have a certain degree of budgetary union, giving 
some discretionary power to spend and to tax to a European executive, backed by a full 
democratic accountability of those who are given the authority to spend and to tax. Too strong 
centralization of national budgets would lead to other problems, in particular moral hazard 
93 
 
problems. It also needs an increased institutionalized coordination of several economic policy 
instruments that have macroeconomic consequences; social policies and wage formation.  
Fault lines in the Eurozone (De Grauwe, 2010) from becoming a political union are factors 
such as no mechanisms to ensure convergence of members’ competitive positions, and thus 
prevent major trade imbalances. There is no mechanism to resolve crisis caused by these 
imbalances and divergent competitive positions. A full political union seems unrealistic; it 
would imply a significant transfer of spending and taxing powers to a central EU government 
and parliament. The political union must be able to; prevent massive divergences in 
competitive positions and trade imbalances within the Eurozone.  
Complications 
Complications in the Eurozone today, which make it difficult to adapt, are corruption in some 
countries (mostly the southern European), people’s opinions and culture. If a political union 
were to be implemented, it would require a relatively long-term perspective and excessive 
planning, at least 20 years.  
When having a long-term perspective, such structural measures as mentioned in this section 
have the potential to become more beneficial than a break-up of the Eurozone today.  
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7 Conclusion  
The global financial crisis triggered several local crises in the Eurozone, a fiscal crisis, a 
banking crisis, a competitive crisis and a debt crisis. Based on the turbulence in many of the 
Eurozone’s member countries’ financial situation, real economy and government budgets, I 
formulated the problem:  
Does the Eurozone, as it is today, form an optimal currency area? 
The analysis started with an evaluation of the management of the monetary and fiscal policy 
in the Eurozone as a whole. The ECB has managed the monetary policy with success, when 
success only implies keeping inflation close to target. The output has been stable and not 
deviated much from trend, and the interest rate has to some extent been used to correct for 
deviating output. Despite the low interest rates during the mid-2000s, the management of the 
monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole has been satisfactory. When it comes to the 
fiscal situation of the Eurozone, the budget deficit has been below 3% (until the financial 
crisis), but the government debt has exceeded 60% throughout the existence of the euro. A 
centralized budget with associated Eurobonds can be the answer to the fiscal instabilities in 
the Eurozone.  
This thesis have examined whether the Eurozone forms an optimal currency area by analyzing 
each of the 17 member countries’ contribution to increased wealth for the Eurozone in 
relation to theory of optimal currency areas. Furthermore, how the member countries have 
been affected by losing their national monetary policy when entering the Eurozone in form of 
increased volatility in inflation and output, unemployment and in relation to the fiscal 
situation.   
There are a lot of interesting results when analyzing the individual member countries, and 
their effect on the Eurozone and the Eurozone’s effects on the individual countries. Such 
results are that the new member countries have the highest level of trade, shocks in real GDP, 
employment and real demand are relatively symmetric between the member countries and the 
Eurozone as a whole, and even though the desired interest rates between member countries 
deviate by close to 10% in 2011, it does not seem to attract consequences in form of increased 
volatility in inflation and output gap. The unemployment in the member countries has 
significantly declined after becoming a member of the union, and growth appears to be 
sustainable. Fast-growing countries have the highest volatility in inflation, and losing their 
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national monetary policy seems to have led to increased deviation from the 2% target. Slow-
growing countries seem to be less effected by the target rate level.   
The results of the analysis suggest that without Greece, the remaining member countries 
would have formed a better currency area in terms of trade, symmetry in shocks and the 
budget situation. Ireland is the only country that tends to have net costs from the introduction 
of the euro and the loss of its national monetary policy; the costs are in terms of higher 
volatility in inflation and output and budget situation. Ireland has experienced decreased 
wealth in terms of a banking crisis and declining house prices. Greece and Ireland are the two 
countries with the highest level of government debt and budget deficits.  
The analysis is followed by a brief discussion of different scenarios for the Eurozone; a break-
up, no-change and an adapt-to-succeed view, which includes suggestions of measures of 
structural improvements for the Eurozone, e.g. centralized budgets with Eurobonds or 
restructuring the Eurozone into a complete political union.  
 
In relation to the net benefits stated in the optimal currency area theory, I chose to place the 
Eurozone as it is today just above the OCA line due to the relatively high level of symmetry 
in shocks. Main obstacles for flexibility in labor markets are rigidities in prices and wages and 
mobility of labor. One relatively simple measure to increase the degree of mobility of labor is 
to introduce a common language, I suggest English, which will help the Eurozone to become 
a more optimal currency area.  
To answer the problem explicitly; it is very difficult to determine if the Eurozone as it is today 
forms an optimal currency area, many factors suggest “yes”, but many factors also suggest 
“no”. If the Eurozone does not form an optimal currency area today, the Eurozone has 
potential to become an optimal currency area with the right measures and with time.  
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Debt dynamics 
B: government debt 
P: price level 
G: government spending 
T: government tax 
i: government interest rate on debt 
M0: monetary base 
The nominal increase in government debt can be written as;  
    (   )          
Where P(G-T) (nominal value of primary budget deficit) + iB (nominal interest rate on public 
debt) is the nominal budget deficit, and ∆M0 is the change in monetary base.  
This equation gives more meaning when written in percent of GDP, it opens for comparisons 
between countries.  
  
  
  
(   )
 
  
 
  
  
   
  
 
This equation can be written in an easier way when substituting the value sizes with 
percentage sizes; g is government spending in percent of GDP, t is tax income in percent of 
GDP, b is the debt ratio which is debt in percent of GDP, µ is the growth in money supply and 
µm is money financed deficit in percent of GDP.  
Equation 1:  
  
  
            
The debt ratio can be written as 
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           (    )   
  
  
      (    )  
    
  
  
 (    )  
  
  
      (    )  
Where y is growth in GDP and π is inflation (growth in price level).  
The equation can be rewritten as;  
Equation 2:  
    
  
  
 (    )  
We can substitute the debt ratio in equation 2 with the formula for debt ratio in equation 1;  
              (    )  
           (      )  
Fisher;        
           (   )  
In equilibrium, growth rate is constant (∆b = 0);  
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For countries with increasing debt and budget deficit;  
Reduction of debt ratio:  
- 
    
 
 will be reduced if g decreases or t increases, but this can have the unfortunate 
effect of reducing growth and/or inflation 
- Increase inflation; 
a)  increase 
   
  
 by printing more money 
b) Debt erosion; an unforeseen increase in inflation will reduce debt real value ((  )   
   ) 
Debt erosion only works for domestic creditors or debt in domestic currency.  
Debt can be financed by printing money or private loans. 
 
- If the debt is financed by the private sector, it sucks up private savings. This reduces 
the capital stock which leads to steady state and potential income (when investing) 
- There are two effects of printing money; 1) government revenue, seignorage,   
 
 
 
and 2) real income is lost due to inflation, inflation tax,   
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Appendix B: HICP 
 
HICP-CPI DIFFERENCES by the EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Both Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) and Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) measure 
inflation faced by consumers, i.e. the changes in the prices over time of buying goods and services. 
HICPs and CPIs are for the most part based on the same data sources, but they measure inflation with 
different aims and therefore sometimes use different concepts or methods. 
 
The main uses of the HICP are, first, for monetary policy purposes. The ECB defines price stability as 
a year-on-year increase of the HICP for the Euro area of below, but close to, 2% over the medium 
term. The change in consumer prices is one of the convergence criteria used to assess whether a 
Member State is ready to join the euro area. These uses require a harmonised conceptual framework 
and comparable results. In addition, HICPs are becoming increasingly used for economic analyses in 
general – and for indexation purposes. 
 
CPIs play a role in some countries for monetary policy and for economic analysis in general, but also 
have a wide range of other uses, such as for the indexation of commercial contracts, wages, social 
protection benefits, financial instruments. The range of uses made of CPIs varies across countries. CPI 
calculation methods vary as a result, and national CPIs are usually not regarded as comparable for 
cross-country analyses. For the EU, only the HICPs provide comparable measures of consumer price 
inflation, and they are therefore used for cross-country analysis. 
 
The differences between HICPs and CPIs may sometimes be significant in practice, although in 
general the differences have been diminishing as national statistical offices have adopted HICP 
standards also for their CPIs. The main differences are as follows: 
 
• The treatment of owner-occupied housing: Price changes for the Owner-Occupied Housing are 
currently excluded from the HICP. In CPIs they may or may not be included, and, where they 
are included, the methods used differ substantially. 
 
• The coverage of households: The HICP covers households' expenditures taking place within 
the country, whether those households actually live in the country or whether they are merely 
visiting the country and covers institutional households as well. On the other hand, CPIs 
usually record expenditures by resident households, whether that takes place within the 
country or abroad. 
• The coverage and measurement of taxes and fees, and services – such as health, social 
protection, education and insurance services: The harmonised treatment of these expenditures 
is a major asset of the HICP. The HICPs measure the actual prices faced by consumers, so 
after taxes, duties and net of reimbursements, e.g. for medicines. CPIs may use different 
approaches, or exclude parts of such expenditures. 
Some other differences between HICPs and CPIs, at least in some EU countries, concern: the methods 
used to estimate prices for goods when their quality is changing over time; the coverage of price 
reductions during winter and summer sales periods; the coverage of lotteries, games of chance and 
certain financial services and the basic calculation formulae used at the most detailed level to 
aggregate price data. There may be also differences between the national classifications used for the 
CPI and the harmonized classification of the HICP. 
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Appendix C: T-tests 
T-test: One of the most common statistical test, a dependent samples t-test, or a paired 
samples t-test, is used to find significant mean differences between two groups on a particular 
measure. In the case of the dependent samples t-test or a paired sample t-test the two groups 
being compared are related somehow (Lani, 2008).  
Appendix C (a): T-test for differences in inflation  
More deviation before and after euro?   
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means   
        
  Variable 1 Variable 2   
Mean 1,32 1,12   
Variance 1,63 0,32   
Observations 18 18   
Pearson Correlation 0,58     
Hypothesized Mean Diff 0     
df 17     
t Stat 0,4609     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,3254     
t Critical one-tail 1,7396     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,6507     
t Critical two-tail 2,1098     
 
Appendix C (b) T-test for differences in output of times series 
including the financial crisis 
Difference before and after euro     
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means   
        
  Variable 1 Variable 2   
Mean 1,85 2,19   
Variance 1,64 1,32   
Observations 15 15   
Pearson Correlation 0,49     
Hypothesized Mean 
Diff 0     
df 14     
t Stat -1,0870     
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,1477     
t Critical one-tail 1,7613     
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,2954     
t Critical two-tail 2,1448     
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Appendix C (c): T-test for differences in output of time series 
excluding the financial crisis 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for 
Means 
 
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1,49 1,41 
Variance 0,66 0,93 
Observations 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0,35 
 Hypothesized Mean Diff 0 
 df 12 
 t Stat 0,2853 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,3902 
 t Critical one-tail 1,7823 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,7803 
 t Critical two-tail 2,1788   
 
 
Appendix C (d): T-test for differences in growth 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 4,84 1,83 
Variance 4,91 1,20 
Observations 8 8 
Pearson Correlation 0,57 
 Hypothesized Mean Diff 0 
 df 7 
 t Stat 4,6422 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,0012 
 t Critical one-tail 1,8946 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,0024 
 t Critical two-tail 2,3646   
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Appendix C (e): T-test for differences in growth for fast growing 
countries until 2006 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 4,93 3,61 
Variance 6,52 3,17 
Observations 6 6 
Pearson Correlation 0,69 
 Hypothesized Mean Diff 0 
 df 5 
 t Stat 1,7416 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,0710 
 t Critical one-tail 2,0150 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,1420 
 t Critical two-tail 2,5706   
 
 
Appendix C (f): T-test for differences in unemployment  
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 9,33 8,07 
Variance 16,07 8,21 
Observations 18 18 
Pearson Correlation 0,85 
 Hypothesized Mean Diff 0 
 df 17 
 t Stat 2,4680 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,0123 
 t Critical one-tail 1,7396 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,0245 
 
t Critical two-tail 2,1098   
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Appendix D: Output gap 
Mean absolute deviation from "normal" output  
Period / Country 1994 - 2011 Before euro After euro Difference 
Eurozone 1,34 0,93 1,50 0,57 
Austria 1,53 1,00 1,74 0,74 
Belgium 1,04 0,96 1,06 0,10 
Estonia 5,22 5,34 3,89 -1,45 
Finland 2,65 3,06 2,49 -0,57 
France 1,26 0,80 1,44 0,64 
Germany 1,41 0,71 1,67 0,97 
Greece 2,61 1,27 3,47 2,19 
Ireland 4,29 2,20 5,10 2,90 
Italy 1,48 1,37 1,53 0,16 
Luxembourg 2,71 3,09 2,56 -0,53 
Netherlands 1,44 0,90 1,65 0,75 
Portugal 1,53 1,55 1,52 -0,03 
Slovakia 2,61 2,98 1,02 -1,96 
Spain 2,07 1,56 2,26 0,70 
 
When looking at the deviation from normal output for the whole period, the Eurozone as a 
whole deviates in average 1,35%. The countries with most stable outputs, which are outputs 
closest to trends, are Belgium, Germany and France. In countries where outputs tend to 
deviate more from trend is Estonia, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia and 
Spain.  
It is more interesting to look at the difference between the average deviation from output 
before and after the introduction of the euro, to find if the loss of national monetary policy has 
had an impact on volatility in output to the individual country.  
Most positive: Greece and Ireland (> 2%), also Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands and 
Spain. Most negative: Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg and Slovakia; the euro has had a 
positive effect for these countries in terms of volatility in output gap.   
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Appendix E: Growth in real GDP 
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Appendix F: Unemployment 
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Appendix G: Government debt and budget deficit 
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Appendix H: Scorecard 
To illustrate which countries that are contributing most to make the Eurozone an optimal 
currency area H(a), and which countries have had net benefits/costs from being in a monetary 
union (b), I have made scorecards where I sum up the results from the analysis.  
For both scorecards; a total score over 5 points are in a dark shade of green, a score between 1 
and 5 points are in a lighter shade of green, a score of 0 is in yellow, a negative score is red.  
The purpose of the scorecard is to illustrate and present a simple overview of the results from 
the analysis. It can be argued that other factors not included in the scorecard also can have 
relevant effects. I chose not to weight the different factors in relation to each other, either way 
the result is based on subjective measures. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine which 
factor is most important; the scores are all ranged from -5 to 5 and summed up to illustrate a 
positive or negative effect. 
Appendix H (a): Countries contributing to make the Eurozone an 
optimal currency area 
  Openness Symmetry in shocks 
Budget 
situation 
Sum 
Austria 3 4 1 7,7 
Belgium 5 4 -1 7,7 
Cyprus 2 4 -1 4,5 
Estonia 5 3 5 13,3 
Finland 2 5 5 12,0 
France 2 5 -1 5,7 
Germany 2 4 1 6,7 
Greece 1 3 -5 -1,3 
Ireland 3 5 -5 3,0 
Italy 2 5 -3 4,0 
Luxembourg 3 3 5 10,7 
Malta 3 3 1 6,5 
Netherlands 4 4 -1 7,0 
Portugal 2 4 -3 2,7 
Slovakia 5 2 1 8,3 
Slovenia 4 3 1 8,3 
Spain 2 5 -3 4,0 
Factors that I have chosen to include in what makes an optimal currency area in my thesis are 
the degree of openness, symmetry in shocks and the budget situation.  
The first factor that is essential to determine whether or not there are net benefits from a 
monetary union is the degree of trade integration. When scoring openness, I made intervals of 
degree of total trade and gave points.  
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- Total intra EU trade over 100% of GDP: 5 points 
- Total intra EU trade between 75% and 100% of GDP: 4 points 
- Total intra EU trade between 50% and 75% of GDP: 3 points 
- Total intra EU trade between 25% and 50% of GDP: 2 points 
- Total intra EU trade between 0% and 25% of GDP: 1 point 
I made the 25% intervals to set the trade for each country in perspective, and to make an easy 
comparison. The trade score cannot be negative, because all degrees of trade have positive 
impact.  
I have also included the degree of symmetry in shocks in my scorecard. I have given the 
degree of symmetry in GDP, employment and demand a score each, and included the average 
score in the scorecard under symmetry.   
- Correlation with the Eurozone over 90%: 5 points 
- Correlation with the Eurozone between 75% and 90%: 4 points 
- Correlation with the Eurozone between 50% and 75%: 3 points 
- Correlation with the Eurozone between 25% and 50%: 2 points 
- Negative correlation with the Eurozone: -1 point 
These groups are based on my own judgment, each factor (real GDP, employment and 
demand) got an individual score, and the average is presented in the table. Only negative 
correlation can contribute negatively, and I chose to subtract only 1 point in the case of 
asymmetry, due to the fact that it was only one case. All countries have relatively high degree 
of symmetry in shocks (over 25%).  
I chose to exclude flexibility in labor markets due to the difficulty of quantifying it, and due 
to fact that there is a relatively high degree of symmetry in shocks, the need for flexible labor 
markets is not critical.  
I have also chosen to include the budget situation. The risk that one country brings to the 
Eurozone in form of high debt level, and possibility for increased interest rates for the whole 
monetary union, contributes negatively. The scores for each country when it comes to budget 
situation are represented by the level of debt in 2011, combined to the budget deficit in 2011.  
- Countries that fulfilled both Maastricht criteria in 2011: 5 points 
- Countries that violated one of the Maastricht criteria in 2011: 1 points 
- Countries that just about violated both Maastricht criteria in 2011: -1 point 
- Countries that violated both Maastricht criteria and has either a relatively high debt 
level or a high budget deficit in 2011: -3 points 
- Countries that violated both Maastricht criteria by far in 2011: -5 points 
A violation of the Maastricht budget criteria of maximum 60% debt of GDP and maximum 
3% budget deficit of GDP is serious, which is why there is a gap of points between no 
violation and one violation. Countries that violated both criteria got negative scores, but also 
the extent of the violation affects score negatively. Ireland and Greece both got -5 points in 
the budgetary situation due to their high levels of debt and budget deficits.  
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Appendix H (b): Net effects for the single country of being in a 
monetary union 
  Openness Inflation Output Unemployment Budget Sum 
Austria 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Belgium 5 0 0 2 -1 6 
Cyprus 2 0 - -1 0 1 
Estonia 5 0 - -2 0 3 
Finland 2 0 3 5 0 12 
France 2 0 0 2 0 4 
Germany 2 0 -1 0 0 1 
Greece 1 0 0 -1 0 0 
Ireland 3 -3 -3 4 -3 -4 
Italy 2 0 0 3 0 5 
Luxembourg 3 0 3 -1 0 5 
Malta 3 0 - 1 0 4 
Netherlands 4 0 -1 2 -2 3 
Portugal 2 -1 0 -1 0 0 
Slovakia 5 3 - 2 0 12 
Slovenia 4 3 - 0 0 9 
Spain 2 -1 0 5 -2 4 
 
Factors that determines whether a country has gained from joining a monetary union (has 
experienced net benefits) can be the degree of openness, stable inflation, stable output, a 
decrease in unemployment and stable fiscal situation. 
 
The scores of degree of openness are the same as in the scorecard for the optimal currency 
area. This represents an increase in wealth for the individual countries in terms of benefits 
from trade by no transaction costs, no uncertainty in exchange rate and price transparency.  
Less volatility in inflation can lead to gains in form of price stability, and the volatility in 
inflation can be measured by absolute deviation from inflation target (2%) in average. 
Countries with less deviation from inflation target after becoming a member of a monetary 
union have had benefits from being in a monetary union. The score is determined as follows;  
- Less volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; over 2%: 5 points 
- Less volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; 1% - 2%: 3 points 
- Less volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; 0,5% - 1%: 1 point 
- No change in the degree of inflation deviating from target; ± 0,5%: 0 points 
- More volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; -0,5% - 1%: -1 point 
- More volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; over -1% - -2%: -3 points 
- More volatility in inflation after joining the monetary union; over -2%: -5 points 
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Less volatility in output can lead to gains in form of financial stability, and the volatility in 
output can be measured by absolute deviation from trend (output gap = 0) in average. 
Countries with less deviation from trend after becoming a member of a monetary union have 
had benefits from being in a monetary union. The score is determined as follows;  
- Less volatility in output after joining the monetary union; over 2%: 5 points 
- Less volatility in output after joining the monetary union; 1% - 2%: 3 points 
- Less volatility in output after joining the monetary union; 0,5% - 1%: 1 point 
- No change in the degree of output deviating from normal; ± 0,5%: 0 points 
- More volatility in output after joining the monetary union; -0,5% - 1%: -1 point 
- More volatility in output after joining the monetary union; -1% - 2%: -3 points 
- More volatility in output after joining the monetary union; over -2%: -5 points 
The scores for unemployment are given based on the increase/reduction in unemployment 
average after joining the monetary union. ± 0,5% gives 0 points, 0,6-1,5% gives 1 point, 1,6-
2,5% gives 2 points etc. and the same grading criteria for negative effects (increased 
unemployment after joining the Eurozone).  
The scores for the budget situation are bit more complex. The scores are given when 
comparing the budgetary situation for the member countries in 2011 to the average budget 
situation for the period 1999-2011.  
- For countries where the budget situation for 2011 is relatively the same as the average 
budget situation; 0 points 
- For countries which have violated one Maastricht criteria more in 2011 compared to 
the average budget situation; -1 point 
- For countries which have violated both Maastricht criteria in 2011 and did fulfill both 
when looking at the average budget situation; -2 points 
- For countries which to great extent have violated the Maastricht criteria in 2011 
compared to the average budget situation; -3 points 
Countries with negative scores have suffered from the membership in the Eurozone in terms 
of fiscal instability due to the lack of national monetary policy.  
